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[T]he price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press
is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of
rubbish.. .. I would. . . have done with this business of judi-
cialy examining other people's faiths.
-Justice Jackson, dissenting
in United States v. Ballard'
I. INTRODUCTION
The law both represents and sets the limits of our tolerance.
Conduct that is legally wrong is, by definition, that which we as a
society will not tolerate. The law of torts is a powerful weapon in
society's suppression of intolerable activities; its doctrines are flexi-
ble and open-ended and the contours of those doctrines often are
filled in by juries rather than by legal elites. Tort law is thus ex-
traordinarily responsive to and reflective of societal mores, and
serves a useful function in allowing persons who are harmed by
another's actions to sue to recover damages for their injuries,
judged by a common-sense standard of social tolerance.
Tort law governing intentional infliction of emotional distress al-
lows a plaintiff to recover for intangible harm to emotional well-
being caused by the defendant's intentional conduct, if that con-
duct is "extreme and outrageous" and "utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized society."2 Its substantive standards are ill defined, requiring
the trier of fact in each case to render an ad hoc judgment about
the outrageousness of the particular defendant's particular con-
duct.' The limits on damages available to one who proves such a
case are also ill defined; general damages are available, ostensibly
as compensation, yet not measured by actual pecuniary loss. 4 Puni-
1. 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(l) cmt. d (1965).
3. Id. § 46(1) & cmt. h.




tive damages are also available virtually any time the tort itself is
established, because by definition a liable defendant's conduct is
"extreme and outrageous."5 Because of these characteristics, the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a powerful
weapon against socially intolerable conduct. Indeed, it is one of the
most sweeping causes of action in all of tort law.
This Article explores this tort in a single factual context; namely,
when the allegedly outrageous and intolerable conduct is relig-
iously motivated. In such situations, any positive abstract charac-
teristics of the tort as a flexible tool against bad conduct take a
decidedly negative, and even bigoted, turn. Through its remedial
and substantive aspects, the tort threatens both defendants' right
of religious freedom and society's important interest in tolerating
differing religious views. More pointedly, adjudication of such
claims invariably tends to involve the trier of fact in an inquiry
into the verity of the religious belief that motivates the allegedly
outrageous conduct. Such inquiry is prohibited6 because, at a mini-
mum, it requires the trier of fact to decide whether the motivating
belief is "fundamentally flawed."'7
Factually, the vast majority of reported cases falls into one or
more of three categories: 1) suits attacking religious indoctrination
methods;8 2) suits attacking religious discipline methods;9 and 3)
suits alleging "outrageous" spiritual counseling. 10 An example of
the first category is a case in which a defendant believes that his
religion justifies lying to a potential convert about the nature of
the religion, getting the plaintiff into an isolated, cloistered envi-
ronment, and converting him to the religion;" the convert later
5. Id. § 7.3, at 530.
6. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86-88 (1944)); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The gov-
ernment may not ... punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false.")
(citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-88).
7. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass. 1991) (vacat-
ing an intentional infliction of emotional distress verdict in a religious indoctrination case on
the ground that the jury could not decide the claim without exploring whether "the dis-
puted [religious] beliefs are fundamentally flawed"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
8. See infra part IV.B.1.
9. See infra part IV.B.2.
10. See infra part IV.B.3.
11. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 49-51 (Cal. 1988).
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leaves the religion and sues the defendant who has acted on this
belief.12 An example of the second category is a case in which de-
fendants, based on their interpretation of the Bible, "shun" a for-
mer member of their religious group, refusing to have any dealings
with that person and perhaps actively denouncing her to others; 13
the former member then sues.'4 Finally, an example of the third
group is a case in which a minister engages in counseling a parish-
ioner who later commits suicide;' 5 the family of the decedent then
sues the minister on the ground that the spiritual counseling actu-
ally encouraged the suicide by portraying suicide as a religiously
acceptable alternative for someone unhappy in this life.'6
In calling for a restriction of the sweep of this tort, I do not
maintain that the juries in the reported cases were necessarily
wrong in determining that some of the conduct at issue was outra-
geous. Rather, the courts were wrong in allowing the claims to
reach the jury. Many of us rightly may detest the practices de-
scribed in the cases and indeed might conclude that most of the
religious beliefs involved in these cases are wholly bogus. Such re-
actions may be appropriate outside, but not inside, the courtroom.
The key question is whether the law, via the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, should declare such conduct outra-
geous and utterly intolerable in civilized society and award sub-
stantial general and punitive damages against a defendant whose
tortious actions are religiously motivated. For the reasons devel-
oped in this Article, I conclude that our courts have no business
adjudicating such claims.
The power of courts to modify this tort springs from the nature
of the common law itself. Judges make and administer the legal
standards governing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress; they can and should change these standards when they
12. Id. at 46-47.
13. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App. 1984)
(Nally I) (ordered not published by the California Supreme Court), on remand, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (Ct. App. 1987) (Nally I), rev'd on other grounds, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
16. Id. at 305.
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appear to work unjustly.17 This Article exposes one set of particu-
larly baneful effects of this tort relating to important religious
rights and interests and argues that some judicial revisions are nec-
essary simply because this tort is not working justly. I therefore do
not argue for a constitutionally required religious exemption from
a generally applicable law."8 Rather, I suggest the need for courts,
utilizing traditional common law powers, to restrict the scope of
this particular common law tort in a manner that would result in
greater protection of religious freedom, broadly defined, and in the
accordance of greater weight to the societal interest in tolerating
various religious beliefs.' 9 Such a restriction, perhaps a radical one,
17. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo, quoting Munroe Smith, wrote:
Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applica-
ble yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may
not be modified at once, . . . but if a rule continues to work injustice, it will
eventually be reformulated. The principles themselves are continually retested;
for if the rules derived from a principle do not work well, the principle itself
must ultimately be re-examined.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 23 (1921).
18. An overarching discussion of the subject of accommodation of religion, which refers
generally to religion-based exemptions from general regulatory laws, is thus beyond the
scope of this Article. Further, this ground has been well tilled by others. See, e.g., Steven G.
Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PirT. L. REv. 75 (1990) (arguing for elimi-
nation of the accommodation principle); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555
(1991) (arguing for a more balanced understanding of "the Religion Clauses); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (arguing that the accommoda-
tion principle is sound and flows mainly from notions of the value of religious pluralism)
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation of Religion]; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990)
(arguing that accommodation was within the contemplation of the Framers) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding]; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Princi-
ple of the Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEo. L.J. 1691 (1988) (expressing
skepticism about the way that the accommodation principle actually works in cases); Perry
Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (proposing a liberalized rule which would allow for
greater accommodation).
19. My analysis thus does not stand or fall on the argument that courts must hold uncon-
stitutional, on free exercise grounds, the application of this tort against any person whose
conduct is religiously motivated. As a general matter, the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the majority said
that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability,' " id. at 879 (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)), makes any such argument more
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is fully justified because the adjudication of these intentional in-
fliction claims embroils courts in forbidden inquiries. These inquir-
ies have few boundaries or even guidelines and concern the verity,
social value, and acceptability of particular religious beliefs. This is
a major, not a minor, flaw in the tort and calls for major, not mi-
nor, change.
Following this Introduction, Part II describes generally society's
intolerance of antisocial conduct, as embodied in tort law, and then
describes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Part III discusses society's strong interest in religious tolerance
and the well-established tenet that secular courts should not in-
quire into the verity of religious beliefs. Part IV then discusses
many of the reported cases of intentional infliction of emotional
distress that have involved religiously motivated conduct. Finally,
Part V discusses some of the ways that the tort could be revised to
deal with the problems identified in the Article, ultimately sug-
gesting that the tort itself may be flawed in its conception.
II. TORT LAW'S INTOLERANCE OF SOCIALLY UNDESIRABLE CONDUCT
A. General Principles
No area of law is as flexible and responsive to changing social
mores as is torts. This can be seen in the development of new
causes of action, such as unfair competition and products liability,
to accommodate majoritarian notions of right and wrong;20 in the
problematic. The scope and practical impact of Smith is not yet clear. If limited to its
facts-that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit applying criminal drug laws against
the religious use of peyote-then it does not apply to tort law at all. One important scholar,
however, has suggested that Smith might apply to the very kind of case discussed in this
Article, because tort laws are "generally applicable laws." See Douglas Laycock, The Rem-
nants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 45-46. My analysis begins where Laycock's
ends, however; I am arguing that whatever the impact of Smith on tort law adjudication,
courts can and should revise this particular common law tort even if the Free Exercise
Clause does not compel such revision.
For further analyses and criticisms of the Smith case, see, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free
Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991) (concluding that the Court mis-
treated precedent, used poor reasoning, and deprived the Free Exercise Clause of any mean-
ing); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm. L.
REv. 308 (1991) (criticizing strongly the majority opinion, despite the title); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109
(1990) (criticizing the opinion's use of legal sources and its theoretical argument).
20. "In a very vague general way, the law of torts reflects current ideas of morality,
[Vol. 34:579
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open-endedness of the elements that comprise a number of tort
causes of action, via the use of deliberately flexible words such as
"reasonableness" or "outrageousness"; 21 and in the recoverability
of substantial damages for intangible affronts to dignity, even in
the absence of the plaintiff's ability to prove actual economic
harm.22 Responsiveness to social mores of behavior is accomplished
not only in the formation of the law itself, either by a court or by a
legislature, but also by the process of adjudication, which relies
strongly on civil juries to fill in the open-ended terms in the "black
letter law" 23 and to determine the amount of money that should be
shifted from the defendant to the plaintiff.
"So far as there is one central idea" to the law of torts, a leading
treatise notes, "it would seem that it is that liability must be based
upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. ' 24 The same scholars
assert that "it is not easy to discover any general principle upon
which [all torts] may be based, unless it is the obvious one that
injuries are to be compensated, and anti-social behavior is to be
discouraged. '25 Tort law, then, is concerned with deterring socially
intolerable conduct and with compensating persons whom it
harms. Even where the antisocial conduct does not fit into a prede-
termined legal box-that is, an existing tort cause of action-the
conduct may still give rise to a successful tort action by an injured
plaintiff; indeed, this is how tort law evolves.2
This flexibility of substantive tort law is coupled with flexibility
in providing remedies for violations of it. As Leon Green elo-
quently put it, "Tort law is general law for the adjustment of the
hurts that result from everyday activities of people. It has no
and when such ideas have changed, the law has tended to keep pace with them." W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 21 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER & KEETON].
21. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 7, 197-98 (1982) (ex-
plaining the concept of "deliberately flexible" words and giving numerous examples of their
use in legal rules).
22. See DOBBS, supra note 4, § 7.3, at 528-31.
23. See, e.g., Paul T. Hayden, Cultural Norms as Law: Tort Law's "Reasonable Person"
Standard of Care, 15 J. Am. CULTURE 45 (1992).
24. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 1, at 6.
25. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 3-4 ("The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development
are never set.").
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bounds except for their desires for protection and the imagination
of their institutions for giving remedies. 2 7 These remedies include
possibly substantial damages for emotional injuries, the amount of
which is inherently difficult or impossible to measure with any-
thing approaching precision.2" Fixing the amount of such damages
is left largely to the discretion of the jury, which awards damages
on the basis of its sense of the degree of social undesirability of the
defendant's conduct and of the severity of the harm to the particu-
lar plaintiff. As Dan Dobbs explains in his treatise on remedies,
"the courts tend to presume some harm of more than nominal na-
ture in the dignitary tort cases," in part "to preserve rights of the
public generally to be free from oppressive conduct. ' 2
'Tort law's open texture, its ability to respond to and reflect
changing social mores and allow for the ad hoc condemnation of
conduct that strikes a jury as socially undesirable, is both boon
and danger in a democracy. It is a boon because it prevents doctri-
nal moribundity and stagnation and forestalls the widening of any
gap between communitarian notions of right and wrong and the
legal standards that both enforce and influence those notions. Yet
it is a danger because it may extend too ready an invitation for law
to intrude into places where it should not go, and may allow major-
itarianism to ride roughshod over unpopular or minority rights and
beliefs, the protection of which is an important societal value."0
There is no better example of the danger come to fruition than
when a person sues another alleging that religiously motivated con-
duct forms the basis of a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In such a case, the plaintiff urges the court to find
that the particular religiously motivated conduct is extreme and
outrageous, utterly intolerable in a civilized society, and that it has
caused some intangible harm for which the defendant should pay.
27. Leon Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEx. L. REV. 1, 3 (1955), re-
printed in LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW: No PLACE TO STOP IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW 7, 9 (2d ed. 1977).
28. DOBBS, supra note 4, § 7.3, at 528-31.
29. Id. at 531.
30. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 53-68 (1985)
(arguing that tort law treats the beliefs of mainstream religions as presumptively "reasona-
ble" but requires members of more idiosyncratic religions to prove the reasonableness of
their actions and beliefs).
[Vol. 34:579
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B. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is a recent arrival, as causes of action go. Most scholars trace
its origins to the 1897 English case of Wilkinson v. Downton,31 in
which a plaintiff recovered against a defendant for the emotional
shock-and resulting physical consequences-of being told, as a
practical joke, that her husband had been seriously injured in an
accident.32 The tort, however, was created not so much by the
courts as by scholars during the heyday of Legal Realism."3 Wil-
liam Prosser, in a 1939 law review article, boldly proclaimed the
"new tort"3 4 of intentional infliction of emotional distress, al-
though a survey three years earlier showed that twenty-one states
had already allowed recovery for purely emotional distress. 35 As le-
gal historian G. Edward White has pointed out, Prosser and his
academic colleagues did not so much "invent the principle of com-
pensation for emotional distress" as simply "expand the locus of
that principle from isolated 'exceptional' cases to an established
doctrine of tort law."36 This maneuver was fully in accord with
"the emergent theoretical framework of tort law in the 1930s,
which suggested that tort liability be assessed through a 'common
sense' balancing of social interests,"37 and was more broadly based
upon "three familiar tenets of [Legal] Realism: a heightened inter-
est in the insights of the behavioral sciences; an impatience with
31. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
32. Id. at 58, 61. Wilkinson is characterized as "[tihe leading case which first broke
through the shackles of the older law." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 60.
33. For brief but illuminating histories of the tort, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA. AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 102-06 (1980); Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 42-45 (1982).
34. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REv. 874, 874 (1939). Prosser later labeled Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Dis-
turbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1067 (1936) (arguing that a new inde-
pendent tort had already arisen and was "in a process of growth"), as "the classic article on
the subject." William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 40 n.1 (1956)
[hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage].
35. WHITE, supra note 33, at 104 (citing ROSENTHAL, LIABmITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING
FROM FRIGHT OR SHOCK, REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, 18 N.Y. LEG. Doc.
65(E) (1936)).
36. Id..
37. Id. at 102.
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judicial 'fictions' . . . ; and a developing conception of tort law as
an exercise in social policymaking. '38
In 1948, bowing to the arguments of these Realist scholars, the
American Law Institute (ALI) first recognized the cause of action
in its Restatement of Torts.39 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
now provides in section 46: "One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.' ' 0
The Official Comment to this section notes that "[tihe law is still
in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are
not yet determined." 41 While this caveat is certainly still true,
courts generally agree on the three basic elements that a plaintiff
must prove to prevail in a suit alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress: first, that the defendant intended to inflict se-
vere emotional distress; second, that the defendant's conduct was
"extreme and outrageous"; and third, that the plaintiff did in fact
suffer severe emotional distress as a result.42
38. Id. at 104. White further explains:
Several features common to the climate of educated opinion in which Real-
ism came to prominence had interacted in the "discovery" that tort law could
compensate persons for emotional discomfort inflicted by others. The "specula-
tive" nature of emotional injuries had been purportedly eliminated by the in-
sights of the behavioral sciences. The seriousness of the "interests" at stake in
emotional distress cases had gradually been recognized, and the possibilities
for using tort law as a means of protecting various social interests had emerged
as a source of intellectual excitement. Finally, scholars of the 1920s and 1930s
had shown a willingness, uncommon in their earlier scientist counterparts, to
concede that the doctrinal state of an area of tort law was indeterminate and
capable of dramatic change.
Id. at 105.
39. As it first appeared in the Restatement, liability for both "emotional distress" and
"bodily harm" attached where "one. . . without a privilege to do so, intentionally cause[d]
severe emotional distress to another." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). The draft-
ers from the ALI had earlier rejected the idea that intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress was an independent tort. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934). Consequently, dam-
ages for mental distress were recoverable only on a parasitic or "peg" theory, that is, only if
caused by some other recognized tort. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 34, at
41-43.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
41. Id. § 46 cmt. c.
42. Id. § 46(1). Prosser's hornbook puts it thus:
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The second of these elements is most troubling, especially when
the conduct at issue is religiously motivated. This is so both be-
cause of the indeterminacy of the element of "outrageousness" it-
self and because of the means used to establish it. As to the show-
ing needed to establish the "outrageousness" prong of the tort, the
Restatement contains this colorful explanation:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and, utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Gener-
ally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" 43
Courts adjudicating intentional infliction cases generally have fol-
lowed the Restatement formulation of outrageousness, both in
tone and in letter." One could scarcely imagine a tort element
more tied to ill-defined communitarian norms of conduct than this.
So far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the rule which seems to
have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually
tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause,
and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 60.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
44. For a state-by-state compilation of intentional infliction cases decided since 1970,
showing that the vast majority of jurisdictions have recognized the cause of action and have
adopted the Restatement formulation of it, see Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional
Infliction of Mental Distress as Independent Tort; "Outrage," 38 A.L.R.4TH 998 (1985).
Most of the courts that have adjudicated intentional infliction claims based on religiously
motivated conduct have applied the Restatement formulation, including comment d. For
religion cases quoting the Restatement, see, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 61
(Cal. 1988) (quoting Cole, v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987)), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 286 (Colo. 1988) (quoting
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1350 (Colo. 1988)); Madsen v. Erwin, 481
N.E.2d 1160, 1171 (Mass. 1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Richey v. American Auto. Ass'n, 406 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1980)); Hester v. Barnett,
723 S.W.2d 544, 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
396 S.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Mo. 1965)); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176
(App. Div. 1986) (quoting Fischer v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215 (N.Y. 1978)); Guinn v.
Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 783 & nn.64-65 (Okla. 1989) (quoting Eddy v. Brown, 715
P.2d 74, 76 (Okla. 1986)).
Oregon has expressly rejected the Restatement formulation but has adopted a similar one:
the defendant's conduct must be "beyond the limits of social toleration" to fall within the
term "outrageous." Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Or. Ct.
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The "civilized community" must regard the defendant's conduct as
"utterly intolerable" and "atrocious"; the average member of the
community must get positively red faced with resentment, to the
point of shouting.
The Restatement provides, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently noted, "only the most nebulous definition of 'outrageous'
conduct," a situation that "in turn renders the cause of action one
which tends to defy principled adjudication. 45 As one scholar puts
it, the Restatement's description of "outrageous" as found in com-
ment d is
a strange description of a rule of law. Those situations in which
"average members of the community" are up in arms over the
outrageous conduct of individuals are situations in which the
evenhanded application of law is threatened.. . . To suggest, as
the Restatement does, that civil liability should turn on the re-
sentments of the average member of the community appears to
turn the passions of the moment into law.4"
As this same scholar pejoratively observes, this appears to be "ad-
judication unencumbered by doctrine. '47
The problem of the lack of a clear definition of "outrageousness"
is further exacerbated by the fact that intentional infliction cases
often seem to boil down to that single element. As the Restate-
ment itself says, "Severe distress must be proved; but in many
cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's con-
duct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.14
The cases demonstrate that "when the defendant behaves outra-
geously, the plaintiff will not usually be required to show either
intention to cause distress or even a deliberate disregard of a high
App.) (quoting Brewer v. Erwin, 600 P.2d 398 (Or. 1979)), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928
(Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
45. Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 993-94 (Pa. 1987).
46. Givelber, supra note 33, at 52.
47. Id. at 45.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 cmt. j (1965).
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degree of probability that it will result."4 The "outrageousness"
element becomes, in short, "the entire tort. 50
Further, determining whether the defendant's conduct is "outra-
geous" is the jury's job, unless reasonable people could not differ
on the issue.51 This has led one scholar to conclude that the Re-
statement definition of "outrageous" conduct "tells us very little
except that the defendant's fate hangs upon the emotional reaction
of the twelve jurors who hear his case."' 52 Utilization of the jury to
determine this issue may allow what torts scholar John Fleming
calls "prevalent street values" to determine the outcome of a
case. 3 As a general matter, using juries to fill in the contours of
open-ended tort concepts may be a procedure worth defending, be-
cause it allows a large degree of input by a nonelite "community"
into lawmaking.54 However, tort law is so varied and so broad in its
sweep that to generalize one's approval of the jury's function in
one area to other distinct areas may be both simplistic and mis-
guided. Recognizing that intentional infliction of emotional distress
differs in significant respects from all other torts is critical on this
point. As Daniel Givelber has argued persuasively, it is a true hy-
brid.55 It is unlike other intentional torts such as battery, assault,
and false imprisonment, which all provide clearer definitions of
prohibited conduct;5 it is also unlike negligence, which by contrast
implies a low degree of moral condemnation of the defendant's
conduct, focuses primarily on compensation for accidental physical
injury, is widely insured against, and, at trial, tends to involve
49. Givelber, supra note 33, at 46; see, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315,
318 (Mass. 1976); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961); Womack v. Eldridge, 210
S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974).
50. Givelber, supra note 33, at 46.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 46 cmt. h.
52. William H. Theis, The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Need for Lim-
its on Liability, 27 DEPAuL L. REv. 275, 288-89 (1977).
53. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 115 (1988).
54. Indeed, I have made this argument, focusing on negligence law. See Hayden, supra
note 23, at 51-54.
55. Givelber, supra note 33, at 56.
56. Id. at 51.
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much more specific inquiries.57 In summary, the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress
resembles intentional torts in that the distinction between be-
havior and injury is blurred, and it resembles negligence in that
the defendant's conduct is evaluated in terms of a vague stan-
dard. The resemblance to either form of tort ends, however,
when we look for the definitional elements that limit the dan-
gers inherent in these features: there is neither the precise defi-
nition of the prohibited behavior that is characteristic of inten-
tional torts nor the requirement of a palpable, physical injury
characteristic of the unintentional ones.58
Finally, one cannot describe the open-endedness of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress without stressing that
the damages assessed against the defendant are usually inextrica-
bly connected to the degree to which the jury feels the conduct is
"outrageous." This is, after all, a tort that seeks on its face to com-
pensate a plaintiff for emotional distress59-a type of intangible
harm. As Prosser's hornbook reports, in most cases allowing recov-
ery for intentional infliction, severe emotional distress has been
"evidenced by resulting physical illness of a serious character, and
both the mental and the physical elements have been compen-
sated."60 The Restatement formulation, however, does not require
proof of physical manifestation of mental distress for recovery. 1
From the many cases without such proof, Prosser concludes that
"where physical harm is lacking the courts will properly tend to
look for more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that
the mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious. '6 2 This scheme of
awarding damages based on the jury's collective judgment of the
degree of "outrageousness" or social intolerability of the defend-
ant's action clearly has little to do with compensation. Rather,
57. Id. at 56 (stating that in a negligence suit "a jury is rarely presented a story and asked
to decide whether the defendant behaved reasonably simply by referring to its own sense of
appropriate behavior") (emphasis added); see Theis, supra note 52, at 289-91.
58. Givelber, supra note 33, at 56-57.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
60. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 64.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k.
62. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 64.
[Vol. 34:579
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT
damages in an intentional infliction of emotional distress case are
designed primarily to punish the defendant. 3
Thus something of a multiplier effect is inherent in any inten-
tional infliction case: the more outrageous the defendant's conduct,
the higher the plaintiff's damages may go, even without proof of
the severity of the distress. This effect is further multiplied when
punitive damages are awarded on top of the already-punitive gen-
eral damages." The Restatement provides that punitive damages
are available to punish "conduct that is outrageous,"6 5 which
means that a plaintiff who can establish a "case of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct should also be
entitled to punitive damages; if the defendant deserves to be pun-
ished at all, then in some jurisdictions, at least, he deserves to be
doubly punished. '6  The degree of this punishment is not clearly
delineated because "the standards for imposing and assessing pu-
nitive damages remain frustratingly vague. '67
At bottom, then, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress opens the door to uniquely freewheeling and unfettered
condemnation of antisocial conduct. Its breadth and vagueness,
both as to the kind of conduct that is actionable and to the
amount and kind of damages that may be recovered, have never
been limited significantly, as many courts68 and commentators'
have recognized. This is hardly mysterious. The major difficulty
63. Givelber, supra note 33, at 54 ("[T]he outrageousness requirement gives this tort an
unusual focus-punishment rather than compensation."); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking In-
tangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772, 788 n.78 (1985) ("Clearly the
Restatements focus is on situational justice and punishment rather than on the preserva-
tion of emotional tranquility and compensation.").
64. See Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Mea-
sured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 848 (1989) ("The use of 'punitive' damages to provide
for intangible, unprovable, or unmeasurable harms adds confusion to the administration of
punitive damages law.").
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2).
66. Givelber, supra note 33, at 54.
67. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 642 (1980).
68. See, e.g., Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1981) (avoiding saying
that particular religiously motivated conduct was "outrageous" and noting that the court
was dealing with "a recently established area of state law"); Christofferson v. Church of
Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 583 (Or. Ct. App.) ("The type of conduct for which liability may
be imposed for infliction of emotional distress, absent physical injury, is not well defined."),
petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
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with this tort is not that limitations will evolve slowly, but that the
tort itself resists such an evolutionary process. It was created as an
open tort with indeterminate contours, and this very indetermi-
nacy has "free[d] courts of the necessity of rationalizing results in
terms of rules of universal applicability. ' 70 As a result, the tort
may be overly prone to allowing juries to return large verdicts
against defendants "because of who they are rather than what they
have done"71 by failing to prevent the jury's equating "outrageous
with unpopular."7 The danger is particularly serious when the
conduct at issue is religiously motivated because invariably the
religious beliefs motivating the conduct are, in the eyes of the
jury, "other people's faiths. '73 Courts should recognize this danger
and draw some definite limitations on the sweep of this tort to pre-
vent it. 74
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIous FREEDOM AND
TOLERANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
A. General Contours of the Interest in Religious Tolerance
That tolerance of different religious practices and beliefs is an
important societal value hardly can be considered a new idea in
69. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 55 ("[T]he law is clearly in a
process of growth, the ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be determined."); Givelber,
supra note 33, at 45-56 (noting the inherent vagueness of the tort); Theis, supra note 52, at
288-91 (pointing to the residual nature of the outrageousness requirement).
70. Givelber, supra note 33, at 43.
71. Id. at 52.
72. Id.
73. See infra part IV.
74. The United States Supreme Court has recognized similar problems with the indeter-
minacy of this tort in the context of another clause of the First Amendment. In Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court reversed a large jury verdict for the
plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress case on the ground that a magazine
parody alleged to be "outrageous" was protected by the the right of free speech. The Court
explained,
"'Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the ba-
sis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our
longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.
Id. at 55. For a succinct and insightful analysis of the Hustler case, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 11.01[2] (1993).
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this country, although it properly may be considered radical. The
First Amendment to the United States Constitution begins, "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '7 5 Religious freedom was im-
portant to the Founders of this country, as demonstrated tangibly
by the existence of this constitutional guarantee.76
Furthermore, the United States today is an intensely religious
country, a point historian Garry Wills makes in his recent book,
Under God." Wills reports that internationally Americans rank
near the top in rating the importance of God in their lives; on a
one-to-ten scale, Americans average just over eight, behind only
Malta. 78 Fifty percent of Americans believe in angels; 37% in a
personal devil.70 Nine of ten say they have never doubted the exis-
tence of God; eight in ten believe God still works miracles; the
same percentage believe they will be called before God on Judg-
ment Day to answer for their sins; over 90% of Americans say they
pray some time in the week; and 40% of Americans go to church in
a typical week. s0 Our citizens "give more money and donate more
time to religious bodies and religiously associated organizations
than to all other voluntary associations put together." 81
Despite this religiosity,"2 the United States is not a theocracy; it
was expressly not founded as one. There is no single state religion
75. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free
Exercise Clause). The constitutions of all fifty states contain similar guarantees. See Note,
Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through
State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625, 631-34 (1985) (listing and detailing the
various types of state constitutional religion clauses).
76. See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 18; Michael E.
Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 83.
77. GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1990).
78. Id. at 16 (quoting data from GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELI-
GION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE 90S (1989)).
79. Id.
80. Id. Lest that sound low, just 14% of the British and 12% of the French have a similar
attendance record. Id.
81. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEARn INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 219 (1985).
82. Steven Smith has suggested'recently that survey evidence such as that presented by
Wills "measures religiosity at a relatively superficial level," but agrees that "large majorities
of Americans, including more educated Americans, at least give intellectual assent to tradi-
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and there can never be one without violation of the Religion
Clauses. Rather, the government position is one of "benign neu-
trality" towards religion.83 By not interfering with or favoring one
religion over another,84 the government refrains from both interfer-
ence with the flowering of religious freedom and the establishment
of a state religion. As Michael McConnell reminds us, "[R]eligious
liberty is the central value and animating purpose of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment."85 Yet to preserve the public or-
der, secular government requires at least some degree of obedience
from all its citizens without regard to their particular religious be-
liefs.86 The challenge-an incredibly difficult one, if one tries to
tional religious beliefs." Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Con-
stitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 177 (1991).
83. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (asserting that the basic purpose
of the Religion Clauses "is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none com-
manded, and none inhibited," and to create "benevolent neutrality which will permit reli-
gious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference").
84. Two noted scholars recently pointed out that
[tiwo very different propositions emerge from the [United States Supreme]
Court's definition of neutrality under the establishment clause: government
must be neutral between religions, and it must be neutral between religion and
nonreligion. The first proposition, that government may not prefer one religion
over any other, receives overwhelming support in the American tradition of
church and state. . . .The Court's second proposition. . . is problematic from
the standpoint of history and semantics.
Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1559, 1636, 1641 (1989).
85. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 18, at 1.
86. Many of the early state constitutions that predated the enactment of the Bill of
Rights guaranteed religious freedom with express caveats. For example, Delaware added to
its free exercise guarantee, "unless, under Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace,
the Happiness or Safety of Society." DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
RULES (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 70, 70 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION]. Maryland added, "unless,
under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State,
or shall infringe the laws or morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil or religious
rights." MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights 33, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION, supra, at 70, 70. New York added this proviso: "Provided, That the liberty of con-
science, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State." N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. 38, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 75, 75. Massachusetts added, "pro-
vided he doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship."
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 77, 77.
The federal Constitution does not contain such a proviso, although arguably a similar
condition was understood from the beginning. James Madison, who along with Thomas
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protect religious freedom instead of merely ignoring its'-is to
strike a balance that preserves both the public order and the fun-
damental right to religious freedom.
Tort law presents an especially volatile setting for adjudicating
such issues, because tort law and freedom of religion are in a sig-
nificant way diametrically opposed. The former represents the en-
forcement of communitarian intolerance of antisocial acts; the lat-
Jefferson was the primary author of the Religion Clauses, appeared to express this under-
standing in a letter written decades after the ratification of the amendment:
I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace
the line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority
with such distinctness as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points.
The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting coali-
tion or alliance between them, will be best guarded [against] by an entire ab-
stinence of the Govt. from interference in any way whatever, beyond the neces-
sity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect [against] trespasses on
its legal rights by others.
James Madison, Letter to Rev. Adams (1832), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra,
at 107, 107-08 (emphasis added). Certainly, courts consistently have read a proviso of this
sort into the federal Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87
(1944) (stating that the State cannot interfere with "the manner in which an expression" of
religious beliefs is made, "provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace
and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with") (quoting Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)).
A number of state constitutions today contain similar express provisos. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 4 ("This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State."); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("Religious
freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety."); ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("[T]he liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to...
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
State."); MO. CONsT. art. 1, § 5 ("[T]his section shall not be construed to excuse acts of
licentiousness, nor to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of
the state, or with the rights of others.").
87. On this point, compare Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), with Justice O'Connor's concurrence. The majority held that
"generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 886
n.3. Scalia noted that such a decision "will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in," id. at 890, but he regarded this disadvantage as an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government." Id. Although Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the judgment, she disagreed with the reasoning of the majority.
A person who is barred from engaging in religiously motivated conduct is
barred from freely exercising his religion.. . . It is difficult to deny that a law
that prohibits religiously motivated conduct, even if the law is generally appli-
cable, does not at least implicate First Amendment concerns.
Id. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ter represents the protection of unpopular, even antisocial, views
and practices from the majority's tendency to want to squelch
them. "Respect for the religious beliefs of others is particularly dif-
ficult when one does not share those beliefs," wrote Judge Noonan
in dissent in EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing
Co."' "The First Amendment," he continued, "is an effort, not en-
tirely forlorn, to interpose a bulwark between the prejudices of any
official, legislator or judge and the stirrings of the spirit."'
Judge Noonan could have added "any jury" to his list. At its
core, the First Amendment is antimajoritarian; that is, it serves to
protect minority rights against the popular will-against the intol-
erance of the majority.90 As Justice Jackson so aptly put it a half-
century ago, "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials ... .",' In
the context of religious freedom, this means that minority reli-
gions, whether well established over time, such as the Old Order
Amish, or newly developed, such as the Church of Scientology or
the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, should be le-
gally protected against oppression by those who find "other peo-
ple's faiths"-and the exercise of those faiths-outrageous and ut-
terly intolerable.9 2
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's judgment in Smith,
asserted that
the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights
of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority
88. 859 F.2d 610, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077
(1989).
89. Id.
90. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-162 (1986) (identify-
ing and discussing the "primacy of religious toleration"); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (dealing
with the Free Speech Clause). One noteworthy commentator has summed up Bollinger's
thesis: the First Amendment "imposes, in effect, a constitutional requirement upon the citi-
zenry to be tolerant." William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 373 (1991).
91. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
92. A former Solicitor General of the United States has written that "[m]ost religious and
non-religious people will agree that a tolerance by both groups for the views of the other is
one of the surest signs of a civilized society." Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 337, 337.
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and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exer-
cise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian
rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish.9
As David A.J. Richards has argued, "[T]he religion clauses [of
the United States Constitution] rest on a radical understanding of
the primacy of religious toleration." ' 4 Indeed, this religious toler-
ance principle was perhaps more clearly expressed in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776, which served as a model for the Bill
of Rights. That document listed freedom of exercise as one of the
rights that form "the basis and foundation for government."95
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each
other.96
Of course, it would be questionable at best to assert that persons
who migrated to the Colonies did so with the expectation of setting
up a civilization where all religions would be tolerated; 7 it is per-
haps more accurate to say that many of the new Americans wanted
to establish their own religion as the official state religion.98 In-
deed, the Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New
England 1641 made it a capital offense to worship "any other god,
93. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
94. RICHARDS, supra note 90, at 133.
95. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 16 (1776), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 86, at 3, 3-4.
96. Id.
97. Even the use of the word "toleration" causes some historical difficulties. In the colo-
nial period, official government "toleration" of religion usually involved the development of
a list of religions to be "tolerated," and is thus distinct from freedom of religion as we
discuss it today. See Robert S. Alley, The Despotism of Toleration, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 142-49 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
98. For a good, succinct discussion of this historical view, see BELLAH ET AL., supra note
81, at 219-25.
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but the lord god,"99 or to commit blasphemy, 00 and guaranteed
"religious freedom" only to those "orthodox in Judgement, and not
scandalous in life," provided that they conduct themselves "in a
Christian way, with due observation of the rules of Christ revealed
in his word."'' There were always dissenters from this form of
government, of course, ranging from theologian/politicians °2 and
political philosophers'" to revolutionary patriots,10 4 and gradually
99. THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND para. 94,
no. 1 (citing in the margin Deuteronomy 13:6, :10, 17:2, :6; Exodus 22:20), reprinted in
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 86, at 46, 47.
100. Id. para. 94, no. 3 (citing in the margin Leviticus 24:15, :16), reprinted in FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUrION, supra note 86, at 47.
101. Id. para. 95, no. 1, reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION, supra note 86, at 47.
102. For a noteworthy example, Roger Williams wrote in 1644 that "[a]n enforced uni-
formity of religion throughout a nation or civil state confounds the civil and religious," and
that "[t]he permission of other consciences and worships then a state professeth, only can
(according to God) procure a firme and lasting peace." ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY
TENENT, OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE (1644), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 86, at 48, 48-49.
103. John Locke, for instance, wrote in 1689 that
the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to
other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not
that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to
compel any one to his religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the magis-
trate by the consent of the people, because no man can so far abandon the
care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether
prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall em-
brace..
... Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be pun-
ished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they
are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of their own country,
and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left unto
God and themselves.
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONsTrru-
TION, supra note 86, at 52, 52, 55; see also 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. 25, ch.
10 (1748) ("This is then a fundamental principle of the political laws in regard to religion;
that when the state is at liberty to receive or to reject a new religion it ought to be rejected;
when it is received it ought to be tolerated."), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 86, at 57.
104. Samuel Adams wrote that "[iun regard to Religeon, mutual tolleration in the differ-
ent professions thereof, is what all good and candid minds in all ages have ever practiced."
SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (1772), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTrru-
TION, supra note 86, at 60, 60.
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disestablishment-the rejection of a state religion-gained the up-
per hand, as our Bill of Rights reflects. 05
It is true that "religious pluralism ... has characterized
America from the colonial period and grown more and more pro-
nounced."' 0 6 Indeed, the religious pluralism of today, especially as
reflected in the case law discussed in this Article, presents greater
challenges for societal tolerance than did the pluralism of the late-
eighteenth century. Commenting on that earlier period, Thomas
Curry has noted:
Throughout the states, Americans found themselves asserting
that religion was a matter between God and the individual; that
government possessed no intrinsic powers over matters of reli-
gion; and that when secular powers interfered in religious affairs,
they exceeded their huthority, violated religious liberty, and cor-
rupted both Church and State. However, to portray revolution-
ary America as implementing these principles in all instances
would be to misinterpret completely their historical context. In
the absence of any significant number of dissenters from the
dominant Protestant culture, Americans did not bring their ac-
cepted theories of Church and State to bear on the numerous
ways by which governments did exercise jurisdiction in religious
matters, and they continued to maintain the Christian Protes-
tant society inherited from colonial times. 107
It seems beyond debate that "[c]onstitutional interpretation
cannot always be bound to the 'original intent' of the framers, es-
pecially when it is not clear."' 08 Thus, although exploring the in-
tent of the Framers in construing the current general contours of
our religious freedoms may be informative,109 recognizing the
105. Philip Kurland has described this evolutionary process that culminated in the birth
of our Religion Clauses: "This movement began with the religious intolerance that clearly
marked the beginnings of government in New England, continued with the consistently ex-
panding religious tolerance for nonmajority sects that marked later colonial and state gov-
ernments, and culminated in the right to religious freedom embodied in the first amend-
ment." Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM.
& MARY L. RED. 839, 856-57 (1986).
106. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 81, at 225.
107. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PAS-
SAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 190-91 (1986).
108. DEREK DAVIs, ORIGINAL INTENT 167 (1991).
109. As one leading constitutional scholar put it:
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strength of those freedoms-and the related societal interest in tol-
erating different religious beliefs-in the context of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress may be less a matter of
close constitutional interpretation (of any kind) than it is, in Guido
Calabresi's words, a matter of applying to tort principles some
broad "constitutional premises or notions." 110 This is so because in
this particular and limited context, one is concerned not with justi-
fying a religious exemption from generally applicable secular law
so much as with exploring whether this tort, which seeks to enforce
communitarian norms of conduct (and which possesses an almost
complete lack of doctrinal limitations of both remedy and sub-
stance), should be allowed to impinge upon competing, and argua-
bly superior, societal values."' In other words, the key inquiry is
whether, given both the constitutional right to free exercise of reli-
gion and society's weighty interest in tolerating differing religious
beliefs,"' 2 we should allow juries in tort cases to label as explicitly
"outrageous" and "utterly intolerable in civilized society" particu-
lar conduct motivated by those beliefs." 3
It is both appropriate and useful to begin all constitutional interpretation by
consulting the historical intent of the Framers. Indeed, perhaps "[n]o provision
of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment." But, as is so often
true, "[a] too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers [may be]
futile and misdirected," because there is no clear record as to the Framers'
intent, and such history as there is reflects several varying purposes.
Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 41 U. PITr. L. REv. 673, 676
(1980) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
110. CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 45.
111. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
112. John Fleming, stressing the American jury's positive role in "accommodating the di-
versities of its people," has asserted that "in America tolerance of different values, reflecting
ethnic, social and religious diversity, has in modern times come to be hailed as a cardinal
civic virtue." FLEMING, supra note 53, at 116.
113. In the context of an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, the burden on
the right of free exercise of religion is two-fold. First, the tort subjects the defendant to the
possibility of general and punitive damages for intangible emotional harm to the plaintiff,
and second, it directly condemns the defendant's religiously motivated conduct as being
"extreme and outrageous" and "utterly intolerable in civilized society." For a full discussion
of the importance of the concept of burden in free exercise jurisprudence, see Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
The reported intentional infliction cases rightly express no doubt that such actions consti-
tute a burden on religion, recognizing the burden implicitly or expressly. See, e.g., Paul v.
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An analogous issue may be presented, of course, by all of the
flexible terms in tort law. Of the "reasonable man" standard of
negligence law, Calabresi has said that
[o]ur definitions of reasonable are profoundly influenced by the
fact that we have a Constitution which says something about
* . . free exercise of religion. All law responds somewhat to the
gravitational pull of legal notions extraneous to the particular
area of concern. Inevitably, "ordinary" law such as torts re-
sponds especially strongly to the gravitational force that is our
Constitution." 4
The same can be said, it seems, of our definitions of "outrageous."
A jury's willingness to decide that religiously motivated conduct
fits that definition, and a judge's willingness to allow a jury to
reach such a decision, necessarily involves a judgment about the
gravitational pull of the constitutional right to free exercise and
the related interest in religious tolerance. When a jury is allowed to
determine that religiously motivated conduct is "outrageous" and
"utterly intolerable," the court is perhaps suppressing, or failing to
recognize, the proper gravitational pull of these competing princi-
ples. Mainstream religions have no such problem; when the reli-
gious tenets at issue in a case are considered "ordinary," conduct
that is motivated by them will seldom be considered "outra-
geous. 11 5 For while we of course have no officially established
church, we do have a set of "ins" and "outs," one set of religions
that we regard as "real" or "true" and another set of those that are
"bogus" or "weird"-those "other people's faiths" that, in the eyes
of nonadherents, may be socially intolerable when exercised."' To
quote Calabresi again,
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir.) ("We agree that the imposi-
tion of tort damages on the Jehovah's Witnesses for engaging in the religious practice of
shunning would constitute a direct burden on religion."), cert. denied, 484 U.S 926 (1987).
114. CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 46.
115. Cf. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 18, at 1419-20
("One rarely sees laws that force mainstream Protestants to violate their consciences.").
116. To draw such a dichotomy may be overly simplistic; it may be more accurate to say
that there is a spectrum of religion, ranging from the "normal" to the "weird," with the
merely "quaint" somewhere in between. For an interesting and sometimes lighthearted ex-
ploration of this serious subject, see Milner S. Ball, Normal Religion in America, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1990). Professor Ball asserts that "we know normal
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In practice, it is not hard to tell what tenets would be deemed
reasonable in our society . . . .To identify them, one only has
to start with those religions whose ministers, rabbis, or priests
are commonly invited to give the invocations and benedictions
at large public, non-sectarian, banquets. One must then exclude
those beliefs of these ministers, etc., which they cannot give
voice to, even by implication, in such invocations. What is left is
what is "acceptable," what represents reasonable, moderate
faith.117
We pay a high social and psychic cost for our willingness to allow
religions outside of this "moderate" group to be condemned by ju-
ries applying tort principles, through the mechanism of reaching
the determination that religiously motivated conduct is "too outra-
geous to be protected under the Constitution and too unworthy to
be privileged under the law of torts."'118 This cost is nothing less
than an exclusion of certain persons from full membership in soci-
ety because of their religion. Kenneth Karst aptly calls this "the
hurt of exclusion," the avoidance of which is a core responsibility
of the larger organized society.1" 9 American society gains strength
from diversity and from protection of differences, while allowing
those of different beliefs and practices to participate fully in that
larger society. 2  The California Supreme Court recognized this
phenomenon in its 1964 opinion in People v. Woody'' when Jus-
tice Tobriner wrote, "In a mass society, . . . the protection of a
self-expression, however unique, of the individual and the group
religion when we see it," and notes that "[n]ormal religion, I think, exercises a more intoler-
ant hegemony than we openly admit." Id. at 409.
117. CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 54 (calling these moderate religious beliefs "banquet"
beliefs).
118. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 347 (Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) (remanding for reconsider-
ation of the punitive damages award in light of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991)).
119. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 11 (1989).
120. Further, to allow juries to condemn the religious practices of minority religions ar-
guably results in a kind of establishment of a set of "acceptable" religions-a kind of estab-
lishment by process of elimination. Cf. Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and
Ecclesiastical Officers, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (stressing Establishment Clause concerns
raised by such cases).
121. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (reversing criminal convictions of Navajos for possession of
peyote used in religious rites).
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becomes ever more important. The varying currents of the subcul-
tures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it
depth and beauty." '122
Certainly, however, tolerance of religion has its limits. Any broad
suggestion that all religiously motivated conduct should be insu-
lated from all government sanction would be both unworkable and
foolish.123 History confirms the truth of Shakespeare's maxim that
"[t]he devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.11 24 There can be no
doubt that religion has either motivated or served to justify a lit-
any of horrible acts that today's government should be able to reg-
ulate and even penalize through its courts. Suspected witches were
beaten and killed in both England and New England in the name
of religion.1 25 Long before slaveholding came to the New World,
the capture and enslavement of other human beings was rational-
ized in religious terms. 26 In the southern Colonies, Christianity
was used as a means of "exhorting obedience" from slaves.127
Christianity has been used to justify American imperialism, which
has historically involved violent attacks on the persons and prop-
122. Id. at 821.
123. "The state must have the power to intervene in truly exigent matters, even when it
means overriding religious authorities acting upon sincerely held beliefs." Esbeck, supra
note 120, at 7 (arguing nonetheless that many tort claims are incompatible with the Religion
Clauses).
124. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3, at 56 (Kenneth Myrick
ed., New American Library 1965).
125. See, e.g., DAVID C. BROWN, A GUIDE TO THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT HYSTERIA OF 1692
(1984); GEORGE L. KITTREDGE, WITCHCRAFT IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND 274-373 (1929); JOHN
M. TAYLOR, WITCHCRAFT DELUSION IN COLONIAL CONNECTICUT 1647-1697 (1908).
126. In the words of a noted historian of slavery,
[T]he religious zeal of Christians and Moslems had helped to revive and spread
[slavery]. Members of each faith looked upon the other as infidels, and hence
each felt doubly entitled to make slaves of the other. . . . Moors captured in
North Africa and in the Spanish peninsula were held in bondage in Italy,
Spain, Portugal, and France. Christian prisoners suffered the same fate in the
lands of Islam.
Christians and Moslems alike believed it just to hold heathens in servitude,
and both found victims among the Negroes of Africa .... The Christian pur-
chasers liked to think of themselves as the agents of civilization and of the true
religion.
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 16-17 (1956).
127. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 37 (1978) (quoting Reverend
Thomas Bacon's sermon to a slave congregation, which stressed that "slaves who desired to
be good Christians could become so only by being 'good slaves' ").
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erty of citizens of other nations.' Today, members of the Pacific
Northwest's Aryan Nations "preach[] a religion of white su-
premacy" and call their movement "The Church of Jesus Christ
Christian.' ' 29 The reportedly charismatic young leader of the Colo-
rado Ku Klux Klan has been quoted as saying matter-of-factly
that the reason Jews are not welcome in his organization is that it
is "a white, Christian organization.' 30
But while allowing religious motivation' 3' to excuse all violations
of law is not desirable, neither is regarding religious motivation as
entirely irrelevant in groping for proper legal solutions to 'difficult
questions. For at this extreme, we ignore the first phrases of the
First Amendment, phrases that expressly grant important rights,
and indeed we ignore a good deal of our own history. We also place
too little emphasis on the value of having persons of various reli-
gious views and practices enter into full membership in society
without fear of oppression because of their minority religious
beliefs.
The important American value of tolerating differing religious
views, however, is often difficult to balance against other values
more expressive of majoritarian will. As Karst explains,
The venture that is the United States has always included many
cultures, founded on a multitude of races and religions and eth-
128. For example, United States Senator Albert Beveridge told a Chicago audience in
1900 that God's hand has been in American expansionism all along; that "resistance to the
continuance to-day of the eternal movement of the American people toward the mastery of
the world" is futile; and that this destiny is "definite, splendid and holy." Albert J. Bever-
idge, The Star of Empire, Speech Opening the Republican Campaign for the West in the
Auditorium (Sept. 25, 1900), in THE MEANING OF THE TIMES AND OTHER SPEECHES 118, 142
(1908), reprinted in GOD'S NEW ISRAEL: RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN DESTINY
140, 153 (Conrad Cherry ed., 1971). Far from being repudiated by the masses, this speech
was later used as a Republican Party campaign document. Id.
129. Walter Hatch et al., Neo-Nazi Plot Aimed at Gay Bar, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15,
1990, at Al.
130. Dirk Johnson, Colorado Klansman Refines Message for the 90's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1992, at 16.
131. Of course, we may be dealing here not with religious motivation but rather with the
use of religion as mere justification, or mere rationalization, of bad acts. As one article notes,
"Religious traditions have always exhibited extraordinary creativity in fashioning justifica-
tions for persecution and violent confrontation that apparently are at odds with the progres-
sive implications of their fundamental beliefs." Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, De-
mocracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1589 (1987).
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nic identifications. This fact of American life has always compli-
cated the pursuit of American nationhood-the quest for a cul-
ture, a community, an identity that will embrace us all.13 2
In the context of a case in which the plaintiff alleges that the de-
fendant's religiously motivated conduct satisfies the elements of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the difficul-
ties are unavoidable. The grand challenge is to develop legal stan-
dards that protect all but penalize none unduly on account of reli-
gious belief. 3 '
B. Courts' Avoidance of Adjudicating the Verity of Religion
A chief means of attaining the delicate balance needed to give
due weight to society's interests in preserving order while tolerat-
ing different religious beliefs and protecting free exercise rights is
for secular courts to avoid adjudicating the truth or falsity of reli-
gious belief. Our courts have recognized for some time that when
the adjudication of some legal question labels, even by implication,
a religious doctrine as false or wrong, the court has strayed into a
forbidden "theological thicket"m' 4 in which other people's faiths
may be subjected, improperly, to legal condemnation. Thomas
Paine warned of the dangers inherent in such a situation:
With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if
every one is left to judge of his own religion, there is no such
thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each
other's religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right;
and therefore all the world is right, or all the world is wrong."15
132. KARST, supra note 119, at 27.
133. As the editor of The Christian Century said recently, "The framers of the Bill of
Rights could not have anticipated the rich pluralism of contemporary America, but they
gave us a framework in which pluralism is something to cherish, not to fear." James M.
Wall, Religious Freedom: Tension and Contentions, 109 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 35, 36
(1992).
134. The phrase is found in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11,
at 1235 (2d ed. 1988), and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Anderson in Molko v. Holy
Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 79 (Cal. 1988) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1084 (1989).
135. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, PT. 1 (1791), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 86, at 95, 95.
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Madison himself, the father of the Religion Clauses, labeled as
"an arrogant pretension" the notion "that the Civil Magistrate is a
competent Judge of Religious Truth." 136 Numerous judicial opin-
ions of this century have reflected this sentiment and debated its
scope. Indeed, the notion that secular courts have no business ad-
judicating the truth or falsity of religious belief is one of the bed-
rock principles utilized in free exercise cases. 3 ' Perhaps no phrase
is as commonly invoked in these cases as "The law knows no her-
esy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establish-
ment of no sect." 138
The real landmark among these cases remains the United States
Supreme Court's 1944 opinion in United States v. Ballard,"19 in
which the majority proclaimed, "[W]e do not agree that the truth
or verity of respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs should have
been submitted to the jury. . . . [T]he First Amendment precludes
such a course."' 40 In that case, the leaders of a religious order
known as the "I Am movement" had been convicted of mail fraud
and conspiracy to defraud. The allegedly fraudulent representa-
tions "covered respondents' alleged religious doctrines or be-
liefs,' 4' including the statement that Guy W. Ballard, "alias Saint
Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King,"' 42 and
two other family members had supernatural healing powers which
they had used to cure hundreds of sick people.4 3 Representations
such as these were used, the indictment charged, "to obtain from
persons intended to be defrauded by the defendants, money, prop-
erty, and other things of value."'14 4 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, concluded that the trial court had properly kept the issue
136. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 86, at 82, 83.
137. Even Smith recognizes this principle. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990); see Laycock, supra note 19, at 41-42 (analyzing the practical significance of the
Smith Court's approval of this principle).
138. The statement first appeared in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
139. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
140. Id. at 86.
141. Id. at 79.
142. Id. at 79-80.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 80.
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of the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs from the jury,14 5
stressing the dangers of allowing a jury to decide such an issue:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incred-
ible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of
any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter
a forbidden domain. 146
Yet the majority allowed the fraud conviction to stand, moving
Justice Jackson, in dissent, to accuse them of entering the forbid-
den domain they claimed to be avoiding.147 Even though he saw in
the I Am movement's religious teachings "nothing but humbug,
untainted by any trace of truth,11 48 Jackson was troubled by the
notion that any prosecution for fraud could be based upon admit-
tedly religious representations. 4 The problem for Jackson was
that convicting the Ballards of fraud required the jury to decide, as
the indictment alleged, that the Ballards knew their religious rep-
resentations to be false. As Jackson put it, "[A]s a matter of either
practice or philosophy I do not see how we can separate an issue as
to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable."150
The jury therefore had to perform the "impossible task" of sepa-
rating "fancied [religious experiences] from real ones, dreams from
happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance.. . . When
one comes to trial which turns on any aspect of religious belief or
representation, unbelievers among his judges are likely not to un-
derstand and are almost certain not to believe him."'51 Thus, Jack-
son concluded, "Prosecutions of this character easily could degen-
erate into religious persecutioh. . . . I would dismiss the in-
dictment and have done with this business of judicially examining
other people's faiths. '15 2
145. Id. at 88.
146. Id. at 87.
147. Id. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 92.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 93.
152. Id. at 95.
6091993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
One device courts have used-and continue to invoke-to avoid
the "no heresy trials" prohibition while still allowing government
restrictions on religion is the well-worn but largely vacuous "belief/
action distinction. 153 This idea made its first appearance in Amer-
ican case law over one hundred years ago, in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. United States.154 In that
case, the Court upheld, over a free exercise defense, the criminal
conviction of a Mormon for polygamy, stating that "[1]aws are
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac-
tices."1 5 To hold otherwise "would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.' 156
The most famous verbal formulation of the idea came sixty years
later in Cantwell v. Connecticut,51 in which the Court overturned
the criminal conviction of three Jehovah's Witnesses for proselytiz-
ing in a Catholic neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut." 8 Jus-
tice Roberts wrote that the First Amendment "safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment em-
braces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society.' 159
153. For good and recent critical discussions of this distinction, see Lupu, supra note 113;
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 18; Rodney K. Smith, Get-
ting off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the
Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds
and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984).
154. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
155. Id. at 166.
156. Id. at 167.
157. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
158. Id. at 300-01. The Jehovah's Witnesses carried pamphlets and records with them
door-to-door; they asked each resident for permission to play a record, one of which was
titled "Enemies" and contained "an attack on the Catholic religion," according to the Court.
Id. at 301. Clearly, the Jehovah's Witnesses' religious message was not only unpopular, but
deeply offensive to the persons being solicited. Indeed, Jesse Cantwell's conviction for
breach of the peace was based on a near-fight prompted by his playing the "Enemies" rec-
ord for two Roman Catholic men who became "incensed by the contents of the record and
were tempted to strike Cantwell unless he went away." Id. at 303.
159. Id. at 303-04 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890)). Mark Tushnet has pointed out that Justice Roberts' formulation of
610 [Vol. 34:579
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In fairness, the belief/action distinction has pure logic on its
side. In our three-dimensional world, only actions may be re-
stricted, punished, or regulated; how does one abridge the freedom
to think or believe except by striking at some action motivated by
that belief? Unless and until the government is able to read its
citizens' minds, the government can act against a mere belief only
when that belief motivates some action-reading, speaking, moving
one's body, and so forth. Only then is the belief apparent, and only
by striking at conduct that is motivated by that belief can one at-
tack the belief itself.160 Thus the belief/action distinction is little
more than a truism and fails to provide a meaningful guidepost
with which to decide hard questions.
Why, then, does the belief/action distinction retain any vigor? 1 1
Perhaps it is because the distinction provides a means of what
the belief/action distinction in Cantwell was used in free speech cases as well, being "exactly
the one the Court expressed contemporaneously in labor picketing cases." Mark Tushnet,
The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 714-15 n.67 (1986) (citing Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-06 (1940)).
160. "Until belief is manifested in conduct," a student commentator has noted, "it cannot
possibly offend the law or any person. To speak of constitutional protection for religious
belief is thus misleading at best. . . ." Lee W. Brooks, Note, Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1302 n.16 (1986).
161. Ira Lupu has not only criticized the belief/action distinction of Reynolds as having
"drained the free exercise clause of its primary constitutional function," because "relig-
iously-motivated action that [is] also speech [is] already protected" by other clauses of the
First Amendment, he has erected its tombstone and identified its killer. Lupu, supra note
113, at 938. According to Lupu, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), implicitly rejected the belief/action distinction by ignoring it.
Lupu, supra note 113, at 939-42.
It is certainly true that a line of later cases has revised the simplistic belief/action distinc-
tion as the lone inquiry into the degree of permissible burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion; that is Lupu's point. Id. at 939-46. Yet at least in the torts cases, the belief/action
distinction was often the starting point in courts' analysis of whether the adjudication could
proceed in the face of the Free Exercise Clause. The belief/action distinction retains its
vitality, then, because it has been supplemented but not entirely supplanted as an analyti-
cal tool in many reported cases. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F.
Supp. 1125, 1134 (D. Mass. 1982) (quoting with approval Cantwell's formulation of the be-
lief/action distinction); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D.R.I. 1978)
(same), a/I'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 56-57
(Cal. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Wollersheim v. Church of
Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing with approval Cantwell's belief/ac-
tion distinction), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991);
McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823, 830 (Ct. App. 1987) (same); Nally
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Guido Calabresi calls legal subterfuge, a facile way of hiding the
hard questions that would otherwise be faced in the absence of
such a distinction.162 Calabresi has identified two types of fre-
quently used subterfuges, and the belief/action distinction seems
to fit them both. The first, which Calabresi calls "[t]he most im-
portant, and in a way more clearly dishonest," is the subterfuge
that is "designed to hide a fundamental value conflict, recognition
of which would be too destructive for the particular society to ac-
cept."1 3 The belief/action distinction thus allows courts to hold
that religiously motivated conduct is not worthy of protection from
communitarian norms while denying that the underlying religious
belief is being subjected to those same norms. Such denial is neces-
sary simply because the command that secular courts should not
adjudicate the truth or falsity of religious belief is so well estab-
lished and well accepted that no judge is willing to admit that in
some situations minority religious beliefs must, in fact, be rejected
as false for the plaintiff to win a case.
The second type of subterfuge is "a generalization of the slip-
pery-slope argument for absolute language.' 1 64 Calabresi gives the
following example of this second type of subterfuge:
If we admit that the state can regulate religion, we are psycho-
logically, if not logically, more likely to allow such regulation
than if we say that there can be no regulation of religion and
then from time to time define behavior by some cults as not reli-
gious and hence subject to regulation. The refusal to permit po-
lygamy among Mormons in the nineteenth century was certainly
regulation of religion, but the denial that it was such regulation
may have lessened the impact of the decision and led to less
regulation of religion than would have followed from an "hon-
est" admission that some religious beliefs are in practice subject
to state prohibition. 15
Thus if we are not to lose the benefits that the belief/action dis-
tinction may provide, even through legal subterfuge, we should not
v. Grace Community Church, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 231 (Ct. App. 1987) (Nally II) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
162. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172-77 (1982).
163. Id. at 172.




call for its wholesale elimination in a manner that will lead us
down the slippery slope to acceptance of greater degrees of legal
restriction of religious belief qua belief. Instead, we should simply
strive to avoid legal condemnation of religiously motivated conduct
whenever possible, because adjudication of such matters often
places a court in the theological thicket where the verity of the
beliefs themselves is at issue.166 Further, when such condemnation
cannot be avoided, we should require delicacy in the adjudication
of questions implicating freedom of religion, in the form of nar-
rowly drawn, carefully administered legal standards. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is not such a standard.
Even with the belief/action distinction in place as a first step in
the analysis of free exercise cases, we cannot in reality avoid the
hard question of when to abridge freedom of religion, which neces-
sarily involves balancing the invasion of constitutional rights
against the need for that invasion. A chief means of engaging in
such balancing has been the "compelling government interest
test," which originated in Sherbert v. Verner6 7 and which the
Court criticized and at least partially rejected in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith."e8 This test has been used in a variety of contexts,
including tort cases involving allegations that religiously motivated
"outrageous" conduct caused severe emotional distress. 6 9 Basi-
cally, the test provides that government action that burdens reli-
gion is permissible only when justified by a "compelling state in-
166. "The thought that a religion which has no effect upon the secular activities of its
adherents is not a very good religion seems to be one point of agreement between the reli-
gious, the irreligious and the indifferent." I. Beverly Lake, Freedom to Worship Curiously, 1
U. FLA. L. REv. 203, 203 (1948).
167. 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
168. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected Sherbert's
"compelling government interest" test in a case in which Native Americans who had been
fired from their jobs as drug counselors for sacramental use of peyote contended that "their
religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is
not specifically directed at their religious practice." Id. at 878. The majority said, "Even if
we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensa-
tion field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
law." Id. at 884. For a scathing critique of this aspect of Smith and an analysis of how far
this conception might apply to future cases, see Laycock, supra note 19, at 8-10, 30-33, 54-
68.
169. See infra note 173 for cases containing such allegations.
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terest.' 17 0 "It is basic," Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
opined in Sherbert, "that no showing merely of a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this high-
ly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion.' ,,171 In tort cases, courts have held correctly that imposing
tort liability for religiously motivated conduct "presents a suffi-
cient potential deprivation of religious freedom to warrant consti-
tutional scrutiny. '1 72
Courts adjudicating intentional infliction claims against churches
and church officials have been inconsistent in deciding whether the
government's interest is sufficiently compelling to allow tort recov-
ery. The major difficulty, it seems, is that in this context the gov-
ernment interest is especially subject to any number of interpreta-
tions. The government interest in these cases may be' giving its
citizens a forum in which to recover in tort, allowing citizens to
recover for intangible emotional harms, or simply deterring outra-
geous conduct. 73 Thus, even assuming that the "compelling gov-
ernment interest" test survives Smith for use in tort cases gener-
ally, 7 4 it neither provides an efficacious standard in intentional
infliction cases nor focuses the court on the most critical question
170. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
171. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
172. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991); see also Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875,
880 (9th Cir.) (detailing the applicability of constitutional jurisprudence to state tort ac-
tions), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
173. Compare Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 ("We find the practice of shunning not to constitute
a sufficient threat to the peace, safety or morality of the community as to warrant state
intervention.") with Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 347 (Ct. App.
1989) ("[Tlhe state has a compelling interest in allowing its citizens to recover for serious
emotional injuries they suffer through religious practices they are coerced into accepting."),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) and Nally v. Grace
Community Church, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 235 (Ct. App. 1987) (Nally II) ("California's com-
pelling state interest in suicide prevention is served by imposing liability on all those who
undertake to counsel mentally disordered people and whose negligence allow[s] counselees
to commit suicide."), rev'd on other grounds, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1007 (1989).
174. Murphy, the one reported post-Smith case of religiously motivated "outrageous"
conduct, did not use the compelling government interest test but instead focused on a Bal-
lard-type analysis of whether the court could adjudicate the claim without inquiring
whether the underlying beliefs were "fundamentally flawed." Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 348.
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that such cases raise: whether adjudicating the claim is possible
without deciding that the beliefs that motivated the allegedly out-
rageous conduct are "fundamentally flawed. '175 When it cannot,
adjudication threatens to devolve into a forbidden and pernicious
exercise in religious bigotry.
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CASES
INVOLVING RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT
A. The Jury Verdicts
Cases raising a claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress caused by religiously motivated conduct provide perhaps the
clearest illustration of religious intolerance in today's law. Both the
process of adjudication, which requires the trier of fact to deter-
mine whether the conduct is "outrageous" based on ill-defined
communitarian norms of conduct, and the potential results, which
include large general damages awards and punitive damages,
threaten to abridge both religious freedom rights and religious tol-
eration interests in a way that few other legal actions do. As Doug-
las Laycock argues, these lawsuits "threaten the very existence of
the defendant religion. The trials of these cases are generally char-
acterized by attempts to incite the jury to fear and hatred of a
strange faith. '176
There is general agreement that the enforcement of a tort judg-
ment is an exercise of state power. As the United States Supreme
Court said in New York Times v. Sullivan,1 77 "The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. 1 78 Thus the
cases generally have held that the defendant in a tort action in
state court properly may invoke the Free Exercise Clause, made
applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 79 because
court enforcement of the judgment would constitute "state action"
175. See id. at 347-50 (ordering dismissal of the claim because adjudication required an
exploration of whether "the disputed [religious] beliefs [we]re fundamentally flawed").
176. Laycock, supra note 19, at 45-46 (footnote omitted).
177. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that state libel laws are subject to the First
Amendment).
178. Id. at 265.
179. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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that may violate the defendant's free exercise rights. As the Ninth
Circuit said in Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society,"'0
[T]he application of tort law to activities of a church or its ad-
herents in their furtherance of their religious belief is an exer-
cise of state power. When the imposition of liability would result
in the abridgement of the right to free exercise of religious be-
liefs, recovery in tort is barred.'
Yet a number of lower courts-and some higher ones-have al-
lowed such actions to proceed, and several have resulted in jury
verdicts. It is not surprising that juries, if asked to assess general
damages for intangible emotional harms caused by conduct that is
admittedly motivated by unpopular or minority religious beliefs,
will respond with large awards. Six recent cases illustrate this ten-
dency: Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,182 Wollersheim v.
Church of Scientology, s3 George v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness,8 McNair v. Worldwide Church of God,l85
Guinn v. Church of Christ,186 and Murphy v. LS.K.Con. of New
England, Inc. s17 All of these cases involved suits by former mem-
bers and/or relatives of former members against religious organiza-
tions and their officials. In each case the plaintiff asserted a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In each
case the defendant's conduct was found to be, or admitted to be,
religious in nature, but in each case the trial court allowed the jury
to find the defendant's conduct "extreme and outrageous" and "ut-
terly intolerable in civilized society." In each case the jury re-
turned substantial general damages verdicts, and in five of the six,
180. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.) (applying Washington tort law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987).
181. Id. at 880.
182. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
183. 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated,
111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) (remanding for reconsideration of the punitive damages award in
light of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991)).
184. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordered not published by the California Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991) (remanding
for reconsideration of the punitive damages award in light of Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032).
185. 242 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1987).
186. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
187. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
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large punitive awards. That the majority of these verdicts did not
withstand appellate review is of course somewhat comforting to the
critics of these cases, but cannot diminish the basic point: given
the opportunity to assess damages against religious organizations
and officials for religiously motivated "outrageous" conduct, juries
do so with gusto.
In Christofferson, a former member of the Church of Scientology
sued the church, alleging fraud and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.188 Her fraud claims alleged that the church made
"misrepresentations regarding the standard, quality, grade, spon-
sorship, status, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, charac-
ter or qualities of the courses or goods offered." 189 The intentional
infliction claims alleged both "a scheme to gain control of her
mind" 190 and a harmful policy of retribution against her following
her withdrawal from the church."9" A Portland, Oregon jury
awarded her two million dollars. 92 The appellate court reversed
this verdict and remanded the case for a new trial;193 in the new
trial, the jury awarded her thirty-nine million dollars in punitive
damages alone on her fraud claims, which was at the time "by far
the largest punitive award ever in the state of Oregon.
1 94
In Wollersheim, a former member of the Church of Scientology
of California proved at trial that church members knew he was a
manic-depressive and yet subjected him to continued "auditing," a
Scientology indoctrination practice that the court likened to one-
on-one sermons.1 95 The plaintiff also proved at trial that when he
decided to leave the church after ten years of active membership,
188. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 580 (Or. Ct. App.), petition
denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
189. Id. at 593.
190. Id. at 582.
191. Id. at 591.
192. Fred Leeson, $39M Verdict in Scientology Case Reversed, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1985,
at 5.
193. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 608.
194. Fred Leeson, Ore. Jury: Church Must Pay $39M for Fraud, NAT'L L.J., June 16,
1985, at 8. Twenty million dollars of the award was against the founder of the Church of
Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, $17.5 million against the national church, and $1.5 million
against the Portland, Oregon church. Id. This verdict was also reversed. Leeson, supra note
192, at 5.
195. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334-35, 343 (Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
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the church leaders initiated a course of retributory discipline
against him that was intended to cause him emotional distress by
destroying his business. 9 ' In his suit, Wollersheim sought compen-
satory and punitive damages for both negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and fraud; the court dismissed the
fraud count but allowed the emotional distress claims to go to the
jury. 9 ' Rejecting the Church of Scientology's free exercise defense,
the jury awarded Wollersheim thirty million dollars-five million
in general compensatory damages and twenty-five million in puni-
tive damages.'98
An Orange County, California jury granted an even larger award
to the plaintiffs in George v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness.199 In this case, Robin George and her mother sued
the Hare Krishnas for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, libel, and the wrongful death of Robin George's
father. 00 Essentially, plaintiffs claimed that officials of the Inter-
national Society for Krisha Consciousness " 'brainwashed' Robin
into joining [the religion, then] conspired to conceal her from her
parents. ' 20 1 The Krishnas defended their actions in large part on
free exercise grounds, claiming that their proselytization and con-
version methods are part and parcel of their religion and that the
activities plaintiffs complained of were essentially those religious
practices.0 2 The trial court allowed the case to go to the jury,
which retirned a verdict of thirty-two million dollars in general
196. Id. at 335-36.
197. Id. at 336.
198. Id. The California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and modified the damages award on the intentional
infliction claim to $500,000 in general compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 355. In Wollersheim, 111 S. Ct. 1298, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
vacated the court of appeal's decision in order to remand for reconsideration in light of
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
199. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordered not published by the California Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
200. Id. at 230-31.
201. Id. at 221.
202. Id. at 239-40.
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compensatory and punitive damages, fourteen million dollars of
which was for the intentional infliction claims.
20 3
In McNair v. Worldwide Church of God,204 the former wife of an
official in the Worldwide Church of God 205 sued the church and
two church officials for defamation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy.206 The case
arose when, after a schism between "liberals" and "conservatives"
over such theological issues as the church's stand on divorce and
remarriage, plaintiff's husband was demoted and she became disil-
lusioned with the church's direction. 7 The plaintiff became in-
volved with a publication critical of the church, and when her hus-
band learned of this association, their "personal relationship
deteriorated rapidly," leading ultimately to a divorce.20 8 Almost
three years after this divorce, a minister of the church wrote an
article in its weekly publication, the Pastor's Report, discussing
the church's theological teachings on divorce and remarriage. In
that article, its author accused plaintiff of abandoning her husband
and of turning his children against him. 0 9 When the plaintiff
learned about this publication, she became emotionally distressed
and sued; her cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
203. Id. at 231. On their intentional infliction claims, Robin was awarded $250,000 in gen-
eral compensatory damages and her mother received $1.5 million; jointly they were awarded
$12.5 million in punitive damages. Id.
204. 242 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1987).
205. The court described the Worldwide Church of God as "a fundamentalist Christian
faith with an hierarchical structure" whose religious beliefs were "rooted in the Old and
New Testaments." Id. at 825. It was founded as the Radio Church of God in 1933 by Her-
bert W. Armstrong. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 825-26.
208. Id. at 826.
209. Id. at 828-29. The article laid out the three acceptable grounds for divorce recog-
nized by the church, and in discussing "desertion," said:
[A] classic example of this would be Mr. Raymond McNair's situation. His wife
refused to be a wife to him for over two years-to sleep with him, cook for
him, or even civilly communicate with him in a decent manner. Rather, she
had left God's Church and was actively FIGHTING God's Church and Mr.
McNair, turning his children against him and literally cursing him to his face.
Finally, upon advice of Mr. Armstrong and Ted Armstrong, he was finally
forced to make legal the already existing FACT that she had deserted him and
was no longer his wife in any way whatsoever.
Id. at 829.
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distress arose entirely out of the publication of the Pastor's Re-
port.21 0 Rejecting a free exercise defense, the jury awarded
$260,000 in general compensatory damages and one million dollars
in punitive damages.211
At about the same time that California courts were deciding
Wollersheim and George, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided
Guinn v. Church of Christ.12 In this case, Marian Guinn, a former
member of the Church of Christ, sued church elders and the
church for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from their disciplinary actions against
her.21 Guinn had become involved in a sexual relationship with a
man who was not a member of the church, and the church elders
confronted her about it.21 4 Upon her admission of "violating the
Church of Christ's prohibition against fornication," the elders car-
ried out a Biblical disciplinary procedure against her.21 ' The
church elders carried out this procedure in three stages that lasted
over a year: the elders first approached plaintiff and her children
in a laundromat and asked her to appear before the congregation
and repent; later plaintiff met with the elders at the church, at
which time the elders instructed her to stop seeing her companion;
finally, the elders walked up to the plaintiff and her companion in
her driveway and told her that if she did not repent, they would
"withdraw fellowship" from her.21 '
210. Id.
211. Id. at 825. The court of appeal reversed and remanded the case for a new trial be-
cause the trial judge had not properly instructed the jury on the "actual malice" standard
for defamation. Id. at 833-34.
212. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
213. Id. at 767-69.
214. Id. at 767-68.
215. Id. at 768. The Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted in a footnote the disciplinary pro-
cedure, as set forth in Matthew 18:13-17:
[I]f thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between
thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou has gained thy brother.
But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the
mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall
neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the
church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.
Guinn, 775 P.2d at 768 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
216. Id. at 768.
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Knowing that the "withdrawal of fellowship" would involve the
elders' telling the entire congregation of her sexual involvement
with her companion,21  the plaintiff wrote them a letter of resigna-
tion from the congregation.21 When plaintiff met with the elders
one last time to dissuade them from reading the charges against
her to the congregation, she was told that she had no power to
withdraw from the church, based on the religious belief that "all
[church] members are a family; one can be born into a family but
can never truly withdraw from it." 21' Shortly thereafter, plaintiff
was "publicly branded a fornicator '220 by the reading of charges
against her in the church; in addition, the same information was
sent to four other area Church of Christ congregations to be read
aloud "[a]s part of the disciplinary process."'22'
After trial, and over the free exercise objections of the defend-
ants, the jury awarded $441,000 in general compensatory damages
and $386,000 in punitive damages for the torts of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. 222 A divided
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial,
holding that only those actions by the elders taken after Guinn's
withdrawal from the church could support a tort judgment.223
Finally, and most recently, in Murphy v. LS.K.Con. of New Eng-
land, Inc.,224 a mother and her child sued the Hare Krishnas for,
among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on their claim that the church had falsely imprisoned the
217. As the court explained the "withdrawal of fellowship" procedure,
When one member has violated the church's code of ethics and refuses to re-
pent, the elders read aloud to the congregation those scriptures which were
violated. The congregation then withdraws its fellowship from the wayward
member by refusing to acknowledge that person's presence. According to the
Elders, this process serves a dual purpose: it causes the transgressor to feel
lonely and thus to desire repentence and a return to fellowship with the other
members; and secondly, it ensures that the church and its remaining members
continue to be pure and free from sin.
Id. n.2.
218. Id. at 768.
219. Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Of this amount, $122,000 was for general compensatory damages, and $81,000 was
for punitive damages on the intentional infliction claim. Id. at 785 n.77.
223. Id. at 786.
224. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
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child,225 had subjected her to assaults and batteries, and by its in-
doctrination activities had caused severe emotional distress to both
the child and her mother.226 The trial court denied a defense mo-
tion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, and the jury
returned a verdict of $610,000 for the plaintiffs.2
B. Classification by Type of Allegedly "Outrageous" Conduct
If categorized according to the type of allegedly "outrageous"
conduct they involve, the reported cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by religiously motivated conduct fall, with few
exceptions, into one (or more) of three groups: 1) suits attacking
religious indoctrination methods; 228 2) suits attacking religious dis-
cipline methods, including expulsion from membership; 229 and 3)
suits alleging tortious counseling, akin to "clergy malpractice. 230 I
will examine each of these groups in turn.
1. Indoctrination
In the reported cases in which the plaintiffs claimed that reli-
gious indoctrination methods were "outrageous" so as to support a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
vast majority of courts have concluded that the plaintiff failed to
state or prove the claim, purporting to avoid any constitutional is-
sues.23' Only one reported case has disallowed such a claim ex-
225. The child was 13 to 17 years old during the events at issue. Id. at 342-44.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 345. On their intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the child and
mother won $210,000 and $350,000, respectively, in general compensatory damages. Id. The
appeals court reversed the judgment on these claims on free exercise grounds. Id. at 354.
228. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability of Religious Association for
Damages for Intentionally Tortious Conduct in Recruitment, Indoctrination or Related
Activity, 40 A.L.R.4TH 1062 (1985) (collecting cases on a number of intentional tort
theories).
229. See T.W. Cousens, Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Church or Religious
Society and Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2D 421 (1951) (describing legal remedies for expul-
sion from church membership).
230. See infra note 454.
231. See, e.g., Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290 (8th Cir. 1981); Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D. Mass. 1982); Church of Scientology v.
Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,
644 P.2d 577, 590-93 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
[Vol. 34:579622
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT
pressly on free exercise grounds. 32 Two California cases, one in-
volving the Unification Church 233 and the other the Church of
Scientology, 3 4 have allowed such claims.
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n,235 two former members of the
Unification Church, Molko and Leal, sued the church for fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment,
on the ground that "they had been fraudulently induced to join
the church through a variety of deceptive tactics" 23 6 that included
"an intense program of coercive persuasion or mind control. '23 7
The trial court granted summary judgment for the church, but the
California Supreme Court reversed as to the fraud and intentional
infliction claims.238
The facts adduced as part of the summary judgment motions
were that two members of the Unification Church approached
Molko, a twenty-seven year-old law school graduate, at a San
Francisco bus stop and invited him to dinner.23 ' The two denied
having any "religious connection" and did not reveal to Molko
their membership in the church.240 At the dinner, they showed
Molko a film of a "farm" and induced him to go there via bus
(with twelve others) after dinner; Molko "did not know and was
not told [the farm] was an indoctrination facility for the Unifica-
tion Church. ' 241 After twelve days of lectures, meetings, and testi-
monials at two different Unification Church facilities, during which
time Molko at several times expressed his desire to go back to San
Francisco, he learned for the first time that the group was "part of
the Unification Church. 24 2 Molko agreed to stay with the group
232. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 191 (1991).
233. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
234. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
235. 762 P.2d 46.
236. Id. at 49.
237. Id. at 54.
238. Id. at 49.
239. Id. at 49-50.
240. Id. at 50.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 51. According to the court, on the third day at the farm, Molko was told that
"the group's teachings derived from many philosophical sources, including Aristotle, Jeffer-
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despite being "confused and angry" and ultimately remained at an
indoctrination facility for five to seven weeks before becoming a
formal church member.243
Molko's coplaintiff, Leal, a college freshman, was similarly ap-
proached in San Francisco, attended a dinner, and then agreed to
go to the "farm" with a group of Unification Church members who
concealed their group affiliation from her.244 On her second day at
the farm, Leal asked specifically if the group members were
"Moonies," and was told that "they were not Moonies, but were a
form of Christian group. "245 After twenty days at indoctrination
centers, Leal learned for the first time that the group was "part of
the Unification Church. ' '241 She remained with the group after
learning its identity and became a formal church member several
weeks later.247
Molko and Leal filed suit against the church after "deprogram-
mers" hired by their respective parents abducted them. 48 In their
suit, Molko and Leal contended that "the same conduct that sup-
ports their fraud actions-i.e., misrepresentation and concealment
of the church's identity for the purpose of inducing them to submit
unknowingly to coercive persuasion-also gives rise to an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. "249
In reversing the grant of summary judgment for the church on
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recognized that the church's arguments on
appeal turned on negating the element of "outrageousness." The
court thus determined that the church's burden on appeal was to
establish "as a matter of law that its conduct. . . was not 'extreme
and outrageous.' ,,25o The court said that "conduct is extreme and
outrageous when it' " 'exceeds all bounds [of decency] usually tol-
son, and Reverend Sun Myung Moon," but he was not told that Moon was the group's
spiritual leader. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 51-52.
245. Id. at 52.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Molko was abducted as he left the final day of the California Bar examination. Id. at
51. Leal was abducted as she sold flowers on the street in Los Angeles. Id. at 52.
249. Id. at 62.
250. Id. at 63.
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erated by a decent society, [and is] of a nature which is especially
calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress . .. ',251 In
this case an issue of fact remained for the jury "as to whether the
Church's conduct was outrageous. '252
The court rejected the church's freedom-of-religion-based con-
tention that because "its actions amounted to nothing more than
'intensive religious practice,' and therefore were different only in
degree, not in kind, from those of many -other religious groups," as
a matter of law its conduct could not be deemed "outrageous. 253
The court found this argument "unconvincing," saying that
"[a]lthough fasting, poverty, silence or cloistered living may consti-
tute intensive religious practice, . . fraud, even though purported
to be religiously motivated, is actionable conduct. '254
The state supreme court's determination that the fraud claim
was well stated thus supported the same conclusion on the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim. The appellate court
had held, in affirming the grant of summary judgment on both
claims, that "it would be impossible to consider Molko and Leal's
theory 'without questioning the authenticity and force of the Unifi-
cation Church's religious teachings.' ,,255 The supreme court dis-
agreed, however, saying:
The challenge here . . . is not to the Church's teachings or to
the validity of a religious conversion. The challenge is to the
Church's practice of misrepresenting or concealing its identity in
order to bring unsuspecting outsiders into its highly structured
environment. That practice is not itself belief-it is conduct
"subject to regulation for the protection of society. '256





255. Id. at 58.
256. Id. at 59 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
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That conduct, being fraught with "fraud," could support a jury de-
termination of outrageousness without any constitutional difficulty,
the court concluded. 257
Two courts trying earlier cases, one in New York 258 and the
other in Massachusetts, 259 arrived at a different result when ana-
lyzing whether the Unification Church's indoctrination methods
could be labeled "outrageous." The New York case, Meroni v. Holy
Spirit Ass'n,26 e is worthy of a closer comparison with Molko. In
Meroni, the court held that motions to dismiss the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claims should have been granted.261
The facts of the case were tragic: Charles Meroni, a student at Co-
lumbia University, had just left a church training program when he
committed suicide.262 His father thereupon sued the church for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his deceased
son's estate and himself. 263 The complaint, which the court pre-
sumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss," 4 alleged
that the church subjected the plaintiff's son to
"highly programmed behavioral control techniques in a con-
trolled environment thereby narrowing his attention and causing
him to go into a trance. He was subjected to an intense fasting
from foods and beverages, a program of chanting and related ac-
tivities." . . . [T]he defendant church sought and succeeded in
exercising a "form of hypnotic control, sometimes called 'brain-
257. Id. at 60 (concluding that the compelling interest of the state in protecting individu-
als from fraudulent induction into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion outweighs the mar-
ginal burden on the church's recruiting practices).
258. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986).
259. Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983). In Lewis, the court
dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint, which purported to allege the torts of "brain-
washing and indoctrination" against the Unification Church. Id. at 11. The complaint al-
leged that plaintiff was recruited and remained with the church for fifteen months, at the
end of which time he suffered "severe psychiatric disorders" allegedly caused by the "brain-
washing and indoctrination techniques" of the church. Id. at 12. The court concluded that
plaintiff was attempting to allege the recognized tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but found, without discussion, that the factual allegations were insufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss. Id.
260. 506 N.Y.S.2d 174.
261. Id. at 179.
262. Id. at 175.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 176.
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washing.'"... [A]s a direct result of this "intensive program",
the decedent suffered an "emotional breakdown". 265
The complaint and bill of particulars further alleged that the
church undertook the recruitment of plaintiff's son with the knowl-
edge "that he was at that time 'emotionally disturbed,' '-266 and al-
leged further that the church subjected him to various "confes-
sions, lectures, and a highly structured work and study schedule"
while at the church's training camp. 67
The New York court accepted the very argument rejected in
Molko, concluding that the church's allegedly tortious conduct
"constitutes common and accepted religious proselytizing prac-
tices, e.g., fasting, chanting, physical exercises, cloistered living,
confessions, lectures, and a highly structured work and study
schedule. ' 26 The court held on this ground that the alleged
"brainwashing" of plaintiff's son was "a method of religious indoc-
trination that is neither extreme nor outrageous,"26 9 and that "the
various activities mentioned above, which allegedly induced the
'mind control', are not considered by our society to be beyond all
possible bounds of decency. 2 70 In short, the court in Meroni found
that the "recruitment and indoctrination techniques used by the
appellant, which are similar to those used by a number of other
organizations, '271 could not, as a matter of law, be deemed "outra-
geous" so as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.21 2
The Church of Scientology has also been subject to splits of
opinion in the case law as to whether its particular indoctrination
methods are "outrageous." One California court has said yes;273 in
two other cases, one from Massachusetts 274 and one from Ore-
265. Id. at 176-77 (quoting Plaintiff's Amended Complaint).







273. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
274. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
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275 urshvgon, courts have said no. In Wollersheim v. Church of Sci-
entology,276 plaintiff attacked the Church of Scientology's indoctri-
nation methods known as "auditing" and "disconnect," as well as a
church disciplinary practice called "fair game," as being "outra-
geous" conduct supporting a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 2 7 7 As mentioned above, a jury awarded Wollersheim
thirty million dollars; the California Court of Appeal reduced the
award to $2.5 million but affirmed the judgment in all other re-
spects, on the ground that the plaintiff was coerced into the reli-
gious practices, thus removing the practices from constitutional
protection. 278
Wollersheim proved at trial that for a seven-year period he was
involved with the Church of Scientology in Los Angeles, during
which time he underwent " 'auditing' at both the basic and ad-
vanced levels. '279 The court explained that
[a]uditing performs a similar function for Scientology as ser-
mons and other forms of mass persuasion do for many religions.
In those religions, ministers, priests or other clergy preach to the
multitude in order to bring their adherents into line with the
religion's principles. Scientology instead emphasizes a one-on-
one approach-the "auditing" process-to accomplish the same
purpose.28
0
275. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition de-
nied, 650 P.2d (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
276. 260 Cal. Rptr. 331.
277. Id. at 336. For the sake of clarity, and following the court's categorization, the allega-
tions regarding "disconnect" and "fair game" are discussed infra notes 399-414 and accom-
panying text.
278. Wollersheim, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 334, 355.
279. Id. at 335.
280. Id. at 343. The court further explained:
Auditing is a process of one-on-one dialogue between a Scientology "auditor"
and a Scientology student. The student ordinarily is connected to a crude lie
detector, a so-called "E-Meter." The auditor asks probing questions and notes
the student's reactions as, registered on the E-Meter.
Through the questions, answers, and E-meter readings, the auditor seeks to
identify the student's "n-grams" or "engrams." These "engrams" are negative
feelings, attitudes, or incidents that act as blockages preventing people from
realizing their full potential and living life to the fullest. Since Scientology
holds the view people actually have lived many past lives over millions of
years, they carry "engrams" accumulated during those past lives as well as
some from their present ones. Once the auditor identifies an "engram" the au-
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The court thus concluded that auditing qualifies as a "religious
practice 28' and conceded that it "may be entitled to immunity
from liability for the emotional injuries it causes" as long as the
auditing is voluntary.2  In this case, however, said the court, the
auditing was not voluntary: "The evidence establishes Wollersheim
was coerced into remaining a member of Scientology and continu-
ing with the auditing process. ' ' 83
The church's coercion of Wollersheim, the determinative factor
in the court's ruling, took numerous forms. "To leave the church or
to cease auditing," the court said, "he had to run the risk he would
become a target of 'fair game,' face an enormous burden of 'free-
loader debt,' and even confront physical restraint. 28 4 These vari-
ous possible sanctions, according to the court, were reserved for
those "who rose to higher levels of auditing and especially those,
like Wollersheim, who became staff members-the rough
equivalent of becoming a neophyte priest or minister. '285
Based on this evidence, and relying heavily on Molko, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that the
ditor and the student work to surface and eliminate it. The goal is to identify
and eliminate all the student's engrams so he or she can achieve the state of
"clear." Students can pass through several levels of "auditing" en route to ever
higher states of "clear."
Id.
281. Id. at 344.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 347.
284. Id. at 346. "Fair game" is Scientology's "redistributive program." Id. at 341. In
describing it, the court drew an analogy to the medieval inquisition, "which neutralized the
'heretic' by stripping this person of his or her economic, political and psychological power."
Id.
"Freeloader debt," the court explained,
was devised by Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard as a means of punishing
members who, inter alia, chose to leave the church ....
"Freeloader debt" was accumulated when a staff member received Church
courses, training or auditing at a reduced rate. The Church maintained sepa-
rate records which listed the discounts allowed. If the member later chose to
leave, he or she was presented with a bill for the difference between the full
price normally charged to the public and the price originally charged to the
member. A person, who stayed in the Church for five years could easily accu-
mulate a "freeloader debt" of between $10,000 and $50,000.
Id. at 345 (footnote omitted).
285. Id. at 344-45.
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constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion" 6 did not insulate
the church from liability for any of the actions on which Woller-
sheim based his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
2 7
The court held that "the state has a compelling interest in allowing
its citizens to recover for serious emotional injuries they suffer
through religious practices they are coerced into accepting. Such
conduct is too outrageous to be protected under the constitution
and too unworthy to be privileged under the law of torts. ' 288
The Oregon court in Christofferson v. Church of Scientology289
faced a situation in which a teenager joined the Church of
Scientology in Portland shortly after her graduation from a Mon-
tana high school, "intending to obtain some work experience before
going to college in the fall."290 She enrolled in various courses of-
fered by the church and its affiliates and became a provisional staff
member of one of the church's entities.29' Less than a year after
her involvement with Scientology began, on a trip to her parents'
home in Montana "to convince them to accept her involvement
in Scientology," she was "locked in the house and 'deprogram-
med.' ",292 Ultimately she "became active in anti-Scientology activi-
ties and participated in 'deprogramming' others.
293
Her lawsuit against the church was for both fraud and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. On the latter theory she at-
tacked not only the church's indoctrination methods, alleging "a
scheme to gain control of her mind and to force her into a life of
service to defendants, '"29 4 but also their disciplinary actions against
her after her withdrawal. 295 The conduct she alleged to be "outra-
286. The Church contended that all of its allegedly "outrageous" courses of conduct "are
forms of religious expression protected by the Freedom of Religion clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions." Id. at 338. Article I, section 4 of the California Consti-
tution guarantees "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or pref-
erence." Id. at 338 n.1 (quoting CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 4).
287. Id. at 338.
288. Id. at 347.
289. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
290. Id. at 580.




295. Id. at 591; see infra part IV.B.2.
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geous" included various "drills" connected to the communications
course she took from the church's related entity,296 the "auditing"
process,197 and the cloistered day-to-day living arrangements of the
church's members.298
The plaintiff testified at trial that she would spend from two to
six hours in each auditing session.299 In addition, she said,
"There was a rule that in auditing that the auditor could never
let the person leave when they were upset. And so I remember a
number of times that I became real upset and just wanted to
leave and go home and get out of the place, but he said: No, just
sit down. The way out is the way through, is the phrase he
used.s30
For about three months, plaintiff lived in a center operated by
the church, sharing a room with two other women and two children
and working "from 8:30 a.m. to 11 p.m. or later" for wages of "a
few dollars a week."s Visits from nonmembers "were not en-
couraged," and plaintiff testified that she was reprimanded once
for having been visited by her mother and one of her friends.302
Her mail was sometimes opened before she received it.303 Church
members ultimately informed her that she would have to "discon-
296. Among the "drills" which comprised the communications course was one called
"bullbaiting," which plaintiff described at trial as being practiced by "sitting with your eyes
open facing another person," and which at times reduced her to tears:
The other person, while you're sitting there staring at them, tries to distract
you by telling you jokes, making fun of you, pointing at you, touching you,
making faces at you, trying anything that they can to make you laugh or twitch
or cry or frown ....
They would make fun of me. * * * Well, they teased me about my religion;
they teased me about sex; they teased me about my looks.. . . As soon as they
found an area that caused me to laugh more or to frown or to cry, they would
go into that area in depth and * * * try and get me embarrassed or to cry or
make some sort of reaction.
Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 585-86.
297. Id. at 587-88.
298. Id. at 589-90.
299. Id. at 588.
300. Id.
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nect" from her parents30 4 and told her that her mother was a "sup-
pressive person" and that such persons could be injured in various
ways, including being "destroyed. '"30 5
The court concluded on this evidence that, as a matter of law,
plaintiff had failed to prove that the church's conduct was "outra-




In the eyes of the court, she was not subjected to any "actionable
threats or coercion" 307 to join or stay in the church.30 8 The court
stressed that the plaintiff's recruitment and indoctrination "were
not so very different than might be used by any number of organi-
zations."30 9 Thus, her intentional infliction claim based on indoc-
trination was reversed on what the court called a "non-constitu-
tional basis":3 10 she failed to prove a requisite element of the tort.
A federal court in Massachusetts reached the same nonconstitu-
tional resolution of a plaintiff's intentional infliction claims with
respect to indoctrination in Van Schaick v. Church of Sci-
entology.' In that case, the plaintiff represented a putative class
of persons who had been members of the Church of Scientology." 2
The complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act,"3 violation of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act,3 14 fraud, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.3 15
Van Schaick was a member of the church from 1971 to 1974,
having worked full-time for the church for a portion of that
304. Id. at 589-90.
305. Id. at 590. The court noted that Hubbard introduced the so-called "fair game" policy
in a policy letter in 1967 stating that "suppressive persons '[mlay be deprived of property
or injured by any means by any Scientologist .... May be tricked, sued, lied to or de-
stroyed.' " Id. At trial, defendants asserted that "this policy had been canceled"; the court
noted that "[tihere was conflicting evidence" at trial "as to the status of the policy and its
meaning." Id. n.13.
306. Id. at 591.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 590-91.
309. Id. at 590.
310. Id. at 583 n.3.
311. 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
312. Id. at 1129-30.
313. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206 (1988).
314. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1964 (1988).
315. Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1130.
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time.316 About a year after leaving the church, her "auditor" con-
tacted Van Schaick, urging her to return to the Church on threat
of "fair game. '317 Unless she returned, "she would be harassed by
the Church and its adherents. '318 She claimed that she was
"locked in a furnitureless room" for two weeks and "was audited
for alleged 'crimes' committed against the Church," after which
time she rejoined the church and remained with it for four more
years.31a During this-second stint with the church, plaintiff was or-
dered to "disconnect" from her husband, and she divorced him.32 0
Ultimately she left the church and sued it and numerous related
entities and individuals; the church moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the ground that "the doctrines and actions alleged as the
basis for each cause of action are religious beliefs and practices. '3 21
Judge Garrity dismissed the two intentional infliction counts re-
lating to "auditing" and "disconnect," concluding that the com-
plaint stated insufficient facts.322 He found that the allegations
with respect to "auditing"-essentially that the church improperly
disclosed information obtained in auditing-lacked specificity.32 3
Finally, as to the "disconnect" practices, Judge Garrity concluded
that being "exhorted . . . to sever family and marital ties and to
depend solely on the Church for emotional support" does not, as a
matter of law, constitute "outrageous" conduct.3 24 Such practices,
he wrote, "are similar to the demands for single-minded loyalty
and purpose that have characterized numerous religious, political,
military and social movements over the ages. '325
In Orlando v. Alamo,326 the Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal
of allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress using
nonconstitutional reasoning similar to that employed in Christof-
316. Id. at 1131. The court, deciding on a motion to dismiss, assumed plaintiff's allega-
tions to be true for purposes of its decision. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1131-32.
320. Id. at 1132.
321. Id. at 1134.




326. 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981).
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ferson and Van Schaick: the plaintiff's failure to prove the key ele-
ment of "outrageousness. "' 27 In Orlando, the parents of a man who
voluntarily joined the Alamo Foundation and repudiated his fam-
ily "in conformance with the teachings and directives of the [de-
fendants] and under their dominating influence"32 s sued the Alamo
Foundation and its founders, Tony and Susan Alamo. The trial
court said that the defendants' conduct was "terrible," but con-
cluded as a matter of law that it was not "extreme and outrageous"
under Arkansas law.3 29 The Eighth Circuit agreed, stating that
"[t]hough [defendants'] alleged indoctrination program, religious
teachings and tactics may be viewed with some consternation, we
hesitate to characterize them as intolerable in a civilized so-
ciety. 3 30
Similarly, in George v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness,33 ' the California Court of Appeal looked at the alleged
"outrageous" acts of the Hare Krishnas towards Robin George, a
member at the time of the acts, and concluded that "[m]any of the
acts relied upon by Robin as 'outrageous' are hardly uncommon
among cloistered religious groups. 3 32 The court found that
"Robin's religious duties and living conditions were identical to all
the other Krishna devotees who voluntarily chose the Krishna
lifestyle. 33 3 The court distinguished Molko3 3 4 on the ground that
fraud was a crucial part of the holding on the emotional distress
claims,33 5 and Wollersheim3 6 on the ground that coercion was in-
327. Id. at 1290.
328. Id. at 1289.
329. Id. at 1290.
330. Id. In so holding, the court recognized that it was dealing with a "recently estab-
lished area of state law," the development of which is "better left to the state courts." Id. at
1290-91 (citing M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Ark. 1980)). The court found as
an independent reason for dismissal that any intentional infliction claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. at 1291.
331. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordered not published by the California Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
332. Id. at 237.
333. Id.
334. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
335. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 237 & n.25.
336. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
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volved in that case. 337 By contrast, George involved no evidence of
physical force or "threats of economic sanctions" against the plain-
tiff.338 Because the complained-of indoctrination activities 3 could
not be considered "outrageous," and because of a "dearth of evi-
dence suggesting that any of these acts were performed by defend-
ants with the intention of inflicting emotional distress on [George]
or even in reckless disregard of that possibility," 340 the jury verdict
in George's favor on the emotional distress claim could not
stand.341
The indoctrination cases illustrate the dangers inherent in adju-
dicating intentional infliction of emotional distress cases in which
the allegedly "outrageous" conduct is motivated by religious be-
liefs. Predictably, courts faced with such claims will try to resolve
the cases on nonconstitutional'grounds by avoiding entirely any
discussion of the role of the right to religious freedom, or the inter-
est in religious tolerance, in their analysis of whether the elements
of the tort have been alleged or proved. Courts adopting this ap-
proach will determine-or will allow a jury to determine-on an ad
hoc basis whether the conduct is outrageous. The determination is
often based on the similarity of the defendant's particular prac-
tices to those of other (presumably acceptable) groups in society.
When the defendant's religious indoctrination methods appear
similar to the recruitment techniques of groups we all know and
respect, then these methods cannot be "outrageous."
For example, in Meroni the court found that the Unification
Church's allegedly tortious acts "constitute[d] common and ac-
cepted religious proselytizing practices, e.g., fasting, chanting,
physical exercises, cloistered living, confessions, lectures, and a
337. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
338. Id.
339. In their brief on appeal, the Georges summarized the evidence that supported the
jury verdict for the plaintiff on this cause of action, including her being "made to work
grueling hours with very little in the way of sleep or sustenance"; having her possessions
taken from her; being "required to do menial labor and forced to beg for money"; being
"deprived of any meaningful contact" with her family or "the outside world"; and being
"deprived of the simple joys of life," including reading, watching television, and listening to
the radio. Id. at 237 n.24.
340. Id. at 237.
341. Id.
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highly structured work and study schedule. ' 3 42 Likewise in Chris-
tofferson, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's "recruitment and
indoctrination ...were not so very different than might be used
by any number of organizations. 3 43 In Van Schaick, the court
found that Scientology's "disconnect" practices "are similar to the
demands for single-minded loyalty and purpose that have charac-
terized numerous religious, political, military and social move-
ments over the ages. 3 44 Finally, in George the court stated that
Hare Krishna indoctrination methods "are hardly uncommon
among cloistered religious groups. '345 In other words, when a court
is able to deny an intentional infliction claim on the ground that
the allegedly outrageous conduct does not seem so different from
the kind of conduct that society generally tolerates, it will do so.
This seems to be a comm6n-sense approach to defining the legal
contours of the ill-defined term "outrageous," yet the weaknesses
in such an approach are apparent in the two cases that have used
it to find that religiously motivated conduct may be "outrageous":
Wollersheim3 46 and Molko.3 47 In each of these cases, the court de-
termined that the church's indoctrination conduct could be consid-
ered outrageous by a jury because of the presence of either fraud
or coercion or both, given that society tolerates neither fraud nor
coercion.348 To the court deciding Wollersheim, the coercive nature
of the Church of Scientology's indoctrination methods, at least as
used on Wollersheim, rendered them "too outrageous to be pro-
tected under the Constitution and too outrageous to be privileged
under the law of torts. 3 49 Said the court flatly, "A religious prac-
tice which takes place in the context of this level of coercion has
342. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986). The court fur-
ther noted that the allegations of "brainwashing" were based upon activities "commonly
used by religious and other groups, and . . . accepted by society as legitimate means of
indoctrination." Id. at 178.
343. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 590 (Or. Ct. App.), petition
denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
344. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D. Mass 1982).
345. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
346. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
347. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
348. Id. at 62-63; Wollersheim, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 336-38.
349. Wollersheim, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
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less religious value than one the recipient engages in volunta-
rily. '350 Similarly, in Molko, the court stressed the Unification
Church's "misrepresentation and concealment of the Church's
identity for the purpose of inducing [plaintiffs] to submit unknow-
ingly to coercive persuasion. '"51 These "continued deceptions,"
said the court, left a question of fact "as to whether the Church's
conduct was outrageous.
' 312
Collectively, these cases represent the view that as long as indoc-
trination practices of a. religious group seem to be similar to those
of other accepted groups, then as a matter of law a jury cannot
label them "outrageous," and thus "intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety. 3 53 When, however, such indoctrination practices do not com-
port with the court's view of the type of practices that other ac-
cepted groups engage in-as was the case in both Wollersheim and
Molko-a jury may so label them. A religion that is too different
from those we consider moderate is therefore always in danger of
having its religiously motivated practices condemned as "outra-
geous" and suffering a large general and perhaps punitive damages
verdict.
Certainly, Wollersheim and Molko stand for the proposition that
if a religion's indoctrination methods include too great a degree of
deception or coercion, they may be condemned as outrageous and
intolerable. Given the indeterminate nature of the tort itself, this
determination depends of course on the specific facts and who the
trier of fact happens to be.354 This proposition should give us
pause, however. If we truly believed in a religion that used "decep-
tion" or "coercion" as part of its indoctrination methods, would we
ever conclude that such methods are intolerable in civilized soci-
ety? Not if we believed, for example, that these means were neces-
sary, or helpful, to the end of eternal salvation or total enlighten-
ment. As William James pointed out almost a century ago, one
cannot "measure the worth" of religiously motivated acts
350. Id. at 346.
351. Molko, 762 P.2d at 62.
352. Id. at 63.
353. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288, 1290 (8th Cir. 1981).
354. See Molko, 762 P.2d at 62-65; Wollersheim, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
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without considering whether the God really exists who is sup-
posed to inspire them[.] If he really exists, then all the conduct
instituted by men to meet his wants must necessarily be a rea-
sonable fruit of his religion-it would be unreasonable only in
case he did not exist. If, for instance, you were to condemn a
religion of human or animal sacrifices by virtue of your subjec-
tive sentiments, and if all the while a deity were really there
demanding such sacrifices, you would be making a theoretical
mistake by tacitly assuming that the deity must be non-existent;
you would be setting up a theology of your own as much as if
you were a scholastic philosopher. 355
If one accepts that secular courts should avoid whenever possi-
ble adjudicating the verity of religious doctrine-including implic-
it findings that religious belief systems are "fundamentally
flawed"-the weaknesses in the noncoistitutional approach to the
intentional infliction/indoctrination cases seem clear. We will con-
demn as outrageous only those things that seem unfamiliar or un-
like anything we have seen before. Unfortunately, we have no clear
standards to guide us in such adjudication. Only one thing is cer-
tain: the mainstream is safe; the indoctrination practices of only
"other people's faiths" 356 will be intolerable in our "civilized"
society.
Douglas Laycock has decried in harsh terms what he sees as per-
secution of these "other people's faiths," reminding us that many
of today's accepted religions were not always considered socially
acceptable. 57 Speaking of the Hare Krishnas, the Unification
Church and the Scientologists, he wrote:
Whatever the merits and demerits of these religions that seem
so odd to most Americans, they are, in historical perspective,
simply the "cults" of our time. Other "cults" appear throughout
the American past. The Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians,
Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses all began as unfamiliar, high-
demand, proselytizing religions, greeted with deep hostility by
more sedate and longer established faiths. . . . Parents of con-
verts reacted in much the same way as modern parents of
355. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NA-
TURE 262 (Collier 1961) (1902).
356. United States v. Balard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1940) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
357. Laycock, supra note 19, at 65.
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Krishna or Unification converts, and angry parents found pro-
fessional help. Today's anti-cult psychiatrists diagnose "coercive
persuasion"; the nineteenth-century equivalent was "religious
insanity. 3 58
In an otherwise bleak landscape, a recent opinion of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Murphy v. LS.K.Con. of New
England, Inc.359 shows great sensitivity to freedom of religion and
may provide something of a model for the adjudication of inten-
tional infliction/indoctrination cases. In that case, a jury had
awarded substantial damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress to a mother and her daughter, who had been a member of
the Hare Krishna religion, Krishna Consciousness. 3 0 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court reversed on the ground that "the trial be-
low impermissibly infringed on the defendant's right to practice
freely its religion." '381 The Murphys candidly admitted in their
brief to the supreme court that their "damages flow from the reli-
gious beliefs and practices to which Susan Murphy was exposed
while she was a member of the Defendant's religious commu-
nity, ' 362 but argued that Susan's emotional distress claim was con-
stitutionally permissible because it was based on the Krishnas'
"actions of teaching those beliefs to Susan" rather than on the be-
liefs themselves.38 3
The plaintiffs' attempt to invoke the belief/action distinction did
not solve the constitutional problem, however, in the court's view.
"The essence of what occurred in the trial," the court said, "is that
the plaintiffs were allowed to suggest to the jury extensively that
exposure to the defendant's religious beliefs was sufficient to cause
tortious emotional damage and to separate Susan from her
mother." 364 Stressing that "[c]ourts cannot question the verity of
religious doctrines or beliefs,"36 5 the court opined:
358. Id.
359. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
360. Id. at 345; see supra note 227 (discussing the amount of damages).
361. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 342.
362. Id. at 347 (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 348 (quoting Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Mass. 1985)).
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Inherent in the claim that exposure to ISKCON N.E.'s religious
beliefs causes tortious emotional damage is the notion that the
disputed beliefs are fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with
a proper notion of human development. While this issue may be
the subject of a theological or academic debate, it has no place
in the courts of this Commonwealth." 6
Because the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
"could not stand in the absence of testimony regarding ISKCON
N.E.'s religious beliefs," judgment for defendants on those claims
was compelled.3 67
Although the court in Murphy asserted that it found the case
"unique,"36 8 it becomes apparent upon reading the reported indoc-
trination cases that invariably, testimony or other evidence con-
cerning the religious beliefs and practices of the defendant forms
the basis for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Because plaintiffs must prove that particular conduct is
"outrageous," they will seek to introduce as much detailed evi-
dence as possible about defendants' religiously motivated prac-
tices.
For instance, in Wollersheim, the key factual allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint involved the "auditing," "fair game" and "dis-
connect" practices of the Church of Scientology;369 the California
Court of Appeal called the factual allegations about the church's
religious practices the "centerpiece of the case that went to the
jury. '37 0 The jury was allowed to return a verdict penalizing the
defendant for this conduct despite the church's assertion that "all
four courses of conduct comprising the intentional infliction claim
are forms of religious expression. ' '371
Similarly, in Molko, the California Supreme Court described in
some detail "the [Unification] Church's practice of misrepresenting
or concealing its identity in order to bring unsuspecting outsiders
366. Id.
367. Id. at 354.
368. Id. at 345.
369. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
370. Id. at 336.
371. Id. at 337-38.
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into its highly structured environment. '3 72 The court in Molko,
though, said that conduct, not belief, was at issue in the case.3 73
Given the tenor of the vast majority of these cases, defendants also
will have an incentive to compare their religious indoctrination
methods with those of other groups, forcing the court and perhaps
the jury to delve more deeply into judging the social acceptability
of the defendants' particular religiously motivated conduct.
The dissenting justice in Molko perceptively recognized the dan-
gers of this approach, writing that the "imposition of liability in
such cases . . . unnecessarily projects the court into the arena of
divining the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. '374 Justice Ander-
son attacked the majority's intentional infliction holding on two
grounds: first, he contended that on the nonconstitutional ground
illustrated by Meroni, Christofferson, Van Schaick, and George, as
a matter of law the indoctrination conduct could not be labeled
"outrageous"; s75 and second, he argued that the intentional inflic-
tion claim, by incorporating the fraud allegations, involved the
court in a forbidden inquiry about the verity of the Unification
Church's doctrine.37  He concluded flatly that "religious conversion
is simply not subject to judicial review, 3 7 7 because "brainwash-
ing and conversion are so inextricably intertwined with religious
faith that they cannot be scrutinized, much less proven, without
questioning the authenticity of the religious teachings of the
Church. 3 78 Justice Anderson admitted that "members of this
372. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 59 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
373. Id. at 58.
374. Id. at 67 (Anderson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
375. Justice Anderson concluded: "The majority opinion rests on a theory of fraudulently
induced brainwashing. However, the conduct of 'brainwashing' itself is not actionable be-
cause that method is commonly employed by religious groups, and it fails to constitute that
outrageous conduct which goes beyond the limits of social toleration." Id. at 75.
376. Id. at 75-80.
377. Id. at 68.
378. Id. at 71. Justice Anderson also asserted, relying on two law review articles by Pro-
fessor Robert Shapiro, that deception in getting someone into a religion does not invalidate
the religion or "raise a presumption of incapacity [of the person so recruited] to affirm the
belief as [his] own." Id. at 69 (citing Robert N. Shapiro, "Mind Control" or Intensity of
Faith, 13 HARv. C.-C.L. L. REv. 751, 789 (1978); Robert N. Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons
and Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1277, 1295 (1983) [hereinafter Sha-
piro, Of Robots]).
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court may detest" the Unification Church's indoctrination prac-
tices.37 9 "Yet," he cautioned, "as Judges we must resist the tempta-
tion to tread into this theological thicket. For it is neither for gov-
ernments, nor their instrumentalities, the courts, to divine the
truth of those teachings. "380
2. Discipline
Religiously motivated disciplinary actions, including "shunning"
and similar practices, have given rise to intentional infliction alle-
gations as well. Unlike indoctrination cases, discipline cases raise
the added issue of the ability of a person who has left a religious
group to be free from the religiously motivated action of the group.
Many of the discipline cases thus exhibit competing free exercise
claims-the freedom of the group to practice its disciplinary acts
versus the freedom of the ex-member not to practice, or even be-
lieve in, the religion.
This dimension of the discipline cases has led one court to hold
that discipline taking place prior to the plaintiff's withdrawal from
the religion may not be actionable in tort while discipline occurring
after withdrawal may be; the court theorized that the plaintiff con-
sents to discipline while a member but not thereafter.38 ' This the-
ory has found some support in the academic press. 32  Other courts
have fallen in line with the majority of the indoctrination cases,
determining simply that religiously motivated discipline is not out-
rageous as a matter of law.383 At least two other cases, however,
have drawn no distinction between current and former members
and have found flatly that religiously motivated discipline is enti-
379. Id. at 80.
380. Id.
381. Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989) (holding that plaintiff con-
sented to prewithdrawal but not postwithdrawal discipline); cf. Wollersheim v. Church of
Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that all discipline is nonconsen-
sual), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
382. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent
Doctrine as Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 949, 975-83 (1986) (arguing for
and outlining a consent theory under which voluntary membership in a religious group
would create a rebuttable presumption that an individual has consented to the group's reli-
gious conduct).
383. See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition
denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
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tled to First Amendment protection and cannot form the basis of a
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4
In Guinn, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict
in favor of Marion Guinn, whom the' church had disciplined for
"fornication," both during her membership and after her with-
drawal from the church.385 Guinn sued the church and three elders
of the church for invasion of privacy and for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.3 86 The majority divided the disciplinary acts
into two categories, prewithdrawal and postwithdrawal, and deter-
mined that prewithdrawal acts were immune from tort liability but
postwithdrawal acts were not.3 87 The court began with the premise
that "the proper inquiry" in the case was whether the disciplinary
actions "constituted such a threat to the public safety, peace or
order that it justified the state trial court's decision to pursue the
compelling interest of providing its citizens with a means of vindi-
cating their rights conferred by tort law."388 Those disciplinary ac-
tions that the church took against Guinn while she was a member,
the court concluded, should be "shielded from scrutiny by secular
judicature '" because they cannot constitute such a threat to the'
public safety, peace, or order.3 90 In reaching this conclusion, the
court looked to the consensual nature of the religious organization
involved, focusing on the right of the group to be free from govern-
ment interference and on the right of the individual member to
consent to the group's practices.3 91 In short, "[u]nder the Free Ex-
ercise Clause the Elders had the right to rely on Parishioner's con-
sensual participation in the congregation when they disciplined her
as one who had voluntarily elected to adhere to their doctrinal
precepts."392 The court quoted with approval Justice Jackson's dis-
384. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.) (ruling on the disci-
plinary action of "shunning"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); Burgess v. Rock Creek
Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (same).
385. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 767-69.
386. Id. at 769 & n.3.
387. Id. at 774, 779.
388. Id. at 773.
389. Id. at 775.
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sent in Prince v. Massachusetts:"'3 "Religious activities which con-
cern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be."394
These same arguments could not be applied, however, to disci-
plinary actions taken against Guinn after she had announced her
withdrawal from the church, and the court held those actions to be
subject to tort liability because they were "not deserving of First
Amendment protection. 3 9 5 Disciplining Guinn "as if she were still
a member by communicating her sin of fornication could be found
'beyond all bounds of decency' "396 and therefore a jury could find
the discipline to constitute the "extreme and outrageous" conduct
required to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.39 7 "Only those 'who unite themselves' in a religious associ-
ation impliedly consent to its authority over them and are 'bound
to submit to it,' ""a the court said.
The court in Wollersheim"9 employed a similar rationale to hold
that neither the Church of Scientology's "disconnect" practice,
which the court said was "similar in purpose and effect to the
'shunning' practiced by Jehovah's Witnesses and Mennonites,
among others,"400 nor its "fair game" disciplinary procedure40 1 was
entitled to First Amendment protection, and therefore both prac-
tices could be labeled "outrageous." Regarding the disconnect
practice, pursuant to which Wollersheim "isolated himself from his
parents, wife and other family members,"4 02 the court concluded
that Wollersheim submitted to the practice only because the
church coerced him, thus removing free exercise protection from
what would perhaps have been a protected activity had it been vol-
393. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
394. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 774 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
For an interesting article discussing this members/nonmembers distinction, see Stephen L.
Pepper, The Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 897 (1981).
395. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 782.
396. Id. at 783 (quoting Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986) (setting forth the
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Oklahoma)).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 779 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872)).
399. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
400. Id. at 348.
401. Id. at 341-43.
402. Id. at 348.
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untary. 03 The court characterized the "fair game" practice as a
sanction used "to induce continued membership in the Church and
observance of its practices,"4 4 likening it to the Inquisition. 0 5 In
this case the Scientology practice went "far beyond the social
'shunning' of its heretic, Wollersheim,"4 °6 giving the state "a com-
pelling secular interest in discouraging" it.407
The Church of Scientology's "fair game" practice provided a ba-
sis for an intentional infliction claim in Van Schaick40 8 as well. In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that Church members, "pursuant to
the Fair Game doctrine," tried to "dissuade her from pursuing her
legal rights" by engaging in such conduct as making "slanderous
telephone calls to her neighbors and employer, physical threats,
and assault with an automobile. ' 40 9 The court found that such alle-
gations did state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, but only after noting that "the Fair Game doctrine has alleg-
edly been repealed as a matter of Scientology doctrine. '410
By contrast, the Oregon court in Christofferson41 1 rejected as a
matter of law the contention that "fair game" was "outrageous"
conduct, albeit on evidence far different from that presented in
Wollersheim or that alleged in Van Schaick. In Christofferson, the
403. Id. at 348-49. The court expressly did not decide whether "disconnect" is protected
activity "in ordinary circumstances," id., although it did hold that "disconnect" is a "reli-
gious practice." Id. at 348.
404. Id. at 344.
405. Id. at 341-43.
406. Id. at 342.
407. Id. at 343. The court described the "fair game" practice against Wollersheim:
[T]he prime focus of the "fair game" campaign was against the "heretic"
Wollersheim's economic interests. Substantial evidence supports the inference
Scientology set out to ruin Wollersheim's photography enterprise. Scientolo-
gists who worked in the business were instructed to resign immediately.
Scientologists who were customers were told to stop placing orders with the
business. Most significantly, those who owed money for previous orders were
instructed to renege on their payments. Although these payments actually were
going to a factory not Wollersheim, the effect was to deprive Wollersheim of
the line of credit he needed to continue in business.
Id. at 342.
408. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
409. Id. at 1142.
410. Id.
411. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition de-
nied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
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plaintiff claimed that the Church filed a libel action against her
without cause, declared her to be a "suppressive person" subject to
the "fair game" policy, forbade any friends from communicating
with her "through threats of mental and physical harm," and
mailed unwanted materials to her and her family.412 The court
found that the evidence only partially supported plaintiff's allega-
tions and, relying heavily on its conclusion that no evidence estab-
lished any actual threats of harm,1 3 held that the trial court
should have granted a directed verdict for defendants on the inten-
tional infliction claim regarding church discipline. 14
Two cases have protected Christian churches' disciplinary ac-
tions from intentional infliction claims explicitly on First Amend-
ment grounds.418 In Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church,1 6 the
plaintiff had been a member of the Rock Creek Baptist Church for
forty years when the church's minister departed to lead a new
church.417 The new pastor and secretary construed plaintiff's help
to the departing minister as her resignation from the Rock Creek
Church, and they thereafter treated her as a nonmember, barring
her from voting in church elections and attending church meet-
ings.418 Plaintiff did not want to leave the church and sued for de-
claratory and injunctive relief and for damages for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 41 9
The federal district court, sitting in diversity, granted summary
judgment for the church on the rationale that "the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution precludes civil courts from adjudicating
disputes involving matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. '420 In hold-
ing that the church's decision as to who is or is not a member of
the church was not a matter subject to secular court adjudica-
tion,421 the court relied heavily on language in Serbian Eastern Or-
412. Id. at 591.
413. Id. at 592.
414. Id. at 593.
415. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 926 (1987); Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30 (D.D.C. 1990).
416. 734 F. Supp. 30.




421. Id. at 33-34.
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thodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,422 in which the United States Su-
preme Court stressed that "it is the essence of religious faith that
ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as mat-
ters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria. ' 423
In Burgess, the court assumed for the sake of argument that the
plaintiff had stated a prima facie case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress but found that the defendants' expelling the
plaintiff and preventing her from taking part in church activities
were privileged actions under the Free Exercise Clause.424 "[T]he
defendants' decision to terminate the plaintiff's RCB Church
membership and their subsequent actions are so inextricably
linked," the court said, "that for the purposes of the First
Amendment analysis, the substance of her lawsuit infringes upon
matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. '425 In part, the court relied on
the Ninth Circuit opinion m Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society,426 a case m which the Jehovah's Witnesses "shunned" a
former member in accordance with church doctrine after her with-
drawal from the church. Paul sued, alleging defamation, invasion
of privacy, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Washington state law.427 The court granted summary judg-
ment for the church, 428 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a broadly
worded constitutional decision.429
Paul claimed that after she had voluntarily withdrawn from the
church following the expulsion of her parents, she was treated
as an excommunicated, or "disfellowshiped," person and was
"shunned. ' 43 0 The court described "shunning" as "a form of ostra-
cism" pursuant to which
[m]embers of the Jehovah's witness community are prohib-
ited-under threat of their own disfellowship-from having any
422. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
423. Id. at 714-15, quoted in Burgess, 734 F Supp. at 33.
424. Burgess, 734 F Supp. at 34.
425. Id.
426. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
427. Id. at 877.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 883.
430. Id. at 877.
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contact with disfellowshiped persons and may not even greet
them. Family members who do not live in the same house may
conduct necessary family business with disfellowshiped relatives
but may not communicate with them on any other subject. 31
Paul testified that some years after her withdrawal from the
church, she twice returned to the area where she used to live and
was shunned by church members;4 2 this treatment prompted her
suit.43 The Ninth Circuit, upholding summary judgment for the
church, said that to allow the suit would constitute a direct burden
on the Jehovah's Witnesses' free exercise of religion 4 4 and that the
practice of shunning did not "constitute a sufficient threat to the
peace, safety or morality of the community to warrant state
intervention. 43
5
The court deciding Paul went on to an even broader ground for
its decision, however, reasoning that intangible harms of the kind
at issue in any intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
simply are not compensable when the allegedly "outrageous" con-
duct is religiously motivated.436 Judge Reinhardt wrote:
Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis
for maintaining a tort action against a church for its prac-
tices-or agamst its members. Offense to someone's sensibilities
resulting from religious conduct is simply not actionable in tort.
431. Id. at 876-77.
432. The court reported these experiences as follows:
Paul visited her parents There, she approached a Witness who had been
a close childhood friend and was told by this person: "I can't speak to you. You
are disfellowshiped." Similarly, in August 1984, Paul returned to the area of
her former congregation. She tried to call on some of her friends. These people
told Paul that she was to be treated as if she had been disfellowshiped and
that they could not speak with her. At one point, she attempted to attend a
Tupperware party at the home of a Witness. Paul was informed by the Church
members present that the Elders had instructed them not to speak with her.
Id. at 877.
433. When Paul left the Church in 1975, she was regarded under Church doctrine not as
"disfellowshiped" (the only category of former members subject to "shunning"), but rather
as "disassociated." Id. However, in 1981, the Governing Body of Jehovah's Witnesses abol-
ished the distinction between "disassociated" and "disfellowshiped" persons, relying on a
number of Biblical passages for their revision of policy. Id.
434. Id. at 880.




Without society's tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protec-
tion of religious differences mandated by the first amendment
would be meaningless.437
The Ninth Circuit's above-quoted principle would fully support
a broad prohibition of intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims in which the conduct alleged to be "outrageous" is relig-
iously motivated because, regardless of the kind of religious con-
duct at issue, the sole damage sought in such claims is for "intangi-
ble or emotional harms." As the court said in its closing sentence,
"The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion re-
quires that society tolerate the types of harms suffered by Paul as
a price well worth paying to safeguard the right of religious differ-
ence that all citizens enjoy 2148
Other courts, however, have tried to distinguish Paul by limiting
it to its facts.4 39 The most noteworthy example occurred in Guinn,
in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court said that "[f]or purposes of
First Amendment protection, religiously-motivated disciplinary
measures that merely exclude a person from communion are vastly
different from those which are designed to control and involve.
440
The former kind of discipline does not require the consent of the
excluded person, reasoned the court in Guinn; the latter does.
441
Like the indoctrination cases, the church discipline cases illus-
trate many of the serious difficulties courts face when adjudicating
intentional infliction cases involving religiously motivated conduct.
With no guidelines to circumscribe the key term "outrageousness,"
and no real limitations on damages assessable against the defend-
ant in such actions, courts are forced to grope for means to accom-
modate the clashing interests that surface in every such case. One
437. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
438. Id. at 884.
439. See, e.g., Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 348-49 (Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) (stressing that
Scientology's "fair game" practice against Wollersheim occurred in a coercive environment);
Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 780-81 (Okla. 1989) (distinguishing Paul on the
ground that the shunning in that case was "passive," unlike the actions that the Church of
Christ took against Guinn).
440. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 781.
441. Id.
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possible solution is found in Paul: simply bar all such actions on
the ground that the defendant's free exercise rights, and the "pro-
tection of religious differences mandated by the first amendment,"
are impermissibly harmed by such adjudications.442
A less drastic possibility is the consent theory, adopted in Guinn
and in part in Wollersheim: if the plaintiff was a member of the
defendant's religion at the time of the allegedly tortious discipli-
nary acts, then a tort action is barred by the Free Exercise Clause
and should be dismissed-unless the plaintiff was coerced into ei-
ther entering the religion or remaining in it; if the plaintiff was not
a member of the defendant's religion at the time of the disciplinary
actions, or was coerced into joining or staying in the religion, then
not only will the Free Exercise Clause not protect the disciplinary
action against liability, but it will tend to operate in the plaintiff's
favor by protecting the plaintiff's right not to be subject to the
discipline motivated by defendant's religious beliefs.
The consent theory is worthy of a closer look. At first glance, the
principle has the ring of common sense and appears to provide a
fair accommodation of differing interests. Certainly, the emphasis
on consent and noncoercion, which is at the center of the courts'
analyses in both Wollersheim and Guinn, seems on its surface to
avoid any entangling inquiry into the verity of religious belief. It
focuses instead on a straightforward, even "neutral," privilege to
intentional torts with its roots in ancient Roman law.443 Specifi-
cally, the idea is that by voluntarily joining a religious group, one
consents to religiously motivated disciplinary actions by other
members of the group and therefore cannot complain about harms
such actions might cause.444
442. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883.
443. See Guinn, 775 P.2d at 784 & n.69 (discussing the maxim volenti non fit injuria).
444. Although it has never applied this sort of rationale to the context of state tort ac-
tions, the Supreme Court has done so in a line of ecclesiastical church dispute cases to
command secular court abstention from adjudicating matters of ecclesiastical government
and religious belief. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724-25 (1976) (stating that when "hierarchical religious organizations ... establish their
own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and. . .create tribunals
for adjudicating disputes over these matters," then the "Constitution requires that civil
courts accept their decisions as binding upon them"); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (holding that civil
courts have "no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving prop-
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A second related strength of the consent theory in this context
derives from the nature of free exercise itself. individuals should be
free to practice one religion or another, or none at all. When a per-
son has chosen one organized belief structure, he should be held to
it until he chooses to withdraw, and therefore he should not be
able to sue his fellow members for disciplining him in accordance
with church doctrine and policy. As soon as that person chooses to
leave one religion, however, either to join another or to join none at
all, the government has an interest in the individual's free exercise
of that choice to leave. The government should then give due
weight to the free exercise rights by allowing a suit by a former
member to prevent interference with his or her free exercise of reli-
gion. Indeed, one justice in Guinn viewed that case in just such a
manner, saying it involved "the competing rights of two parties
who are each entitled to the same First Amendment protection.
. . . [T]he gravamen of the present case resolves upon the plain-
tiff's constitutional freedom to pursue any religion, which includes
her freedom not to pursue any particular religion. '445
A third strength of the consent theory lies in its affinity to other
respected notions about the relationship of law to tightly knit com-
munities. Jerold Auerbach has reminded us that American history
is replete with examples of discrete groups within our society who
rejected "outside" law in favor of alternative means of dispute res-
olution, including the adoption of alternative substantive stan-
dards to apply to those disputes. 44 Of the religious community's
rejection of law in the Colonial period, Auerbach has said:
erty disputes") (emphasis omitted); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952) (stating that "[f]reedom to select the clergy" is a right flowing from "a spirit of free-
dom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation-in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church gov-
ernment as well as those of faith and doctrine"); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
729 (1871) ("It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish
tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should
be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organ-
ism itself provides for.").
The federal district court in Burgess expressly applied this line of cases to a church disci-
plinary action in which the plaintiff sued under state tort law, Burgess v. Rock Creek Bap-
tist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 n.2 (D.D.C. 1990), whereas the courts in Paul, 819 F.2d at
878 n.1, and Guinn, 775 P.2d at 771-73, expressly declined to do so.
445. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 790 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
446. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
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Religious piety persistently sustained a coherent community vi-
sion. Ideally, law and religion might complement each other.
...But the mystical core of religion does not easily co-exist
with the rationality of law. In New England congregations,
among Quakers and Mormons, and in religious utopian commu-
nities, Christian doctrine encouraged alternatives to law. Legal
institutions languished while religion legitimated the social or-
der. . ... As long as religion remained the source of moral vision,
lawyers and courts were superfluous.441 7
As soon as the community disintegrates, however, the need for law
changes. Specifically, individuals resort to the law only when there
is division within the community or some lack of consent to the
communitarian norms. Guinn, for example, presented exactly this
situation: the plaintiff was an "outsider" in need of law who no
longer consented to the alternative dispute resolution methods and
standards she formerly had embraced as a member of her religious
community. 44
Yet despite these positive aspects, the consent theory may be
fatally defective because it does not avoid embroiling courts in a
determination of whether the religious beliefs that motivated the
allegedly outrageous conduct are fundamentally flawed. Indeed,
the defendant in Guinn pointed out this major conceptual diffi-
culty with the majority's determinative distinction between pre-
withdrawal and postwithdrawal acts. 44 9 The majority held that af-
ter Guinn's withdrawal from the church, the church lost its ability
to discipline her with impunity, but the church argued that it
"ha[d] no doctrinal provision for withdrawal of membership....
[A] member remains a part of the congregation for life. Like those
who are born into a family, they may leave but they can never re-
ally sever the familial bond. '450 Thus, the church argued, to allow
liability to turn on the fact of Guinn's withdrawal was to recognize
a distinction that church doctrine does not recognize and would
therefore constitute "a constitutionally impermissible state usurpa-
tion of religious discipline." 51 The court rejected this argument,
447. Id. at 5.
448. See supra notes 385-98 and accompanying text.





purportedly without labeling this particular religious beliet either
flawed or false. The implication, however, is clear: we in secular
society do not accept and cannot tolerate any such belief, and if it
is acted upon, it will be punished. This is a value judgment about a
particular religious doctrine of the Church of Christ; for a court to
maintain otherwise is simple subterfuge.
Furthermore, the court in Guinn used consent theory to distin-
guish between "active" discipline of the kind involved in that case
(which requires consent) and "passive" discipline of the kind pur-
portedly involved in Paul (which does not), a distinction which
rests upon a conclusion about the social acceptability of "passive"
discipline and the social unacceptability of "active" discipline.452
To the extent that shunning, or simple exclusion from member-
ship, is construed as "passive," we will tolerate it. Such behavior
does not threaten us as unbelievers. But as soon as it becomes "ac-
tive," the discipline cannot be practiced against a nonconsenting
person without being subject to being labeled "outrageous" and
"intolerable in a civilized society." Once again, maintaining that
this distinction avoids a secular value judgment about religiously
motivated discipline is illusory, because this distinction labels ac-
tive forms unworthy of protection from communitarian norms.
Despite the surface appeal of the consent theory in the context
of intentional infliction claims brought against church disciplinary
acts, it remains fraught with difficulties. Of the present ap-
proaches, the best appears to be that taken in Paul and Burgess:
disciplinary action motivated by religious belief should be insu-
lated from attack as being "outrageous" and the religious discipli-
narians therefore should be insulated from liability for infliction of
emotional distress. 53 Only this approach gives adequate weight to
the right of religious freedom and the interest in religious tolerance
and keeps courts from inquiring whether the religious beliefs that
motivated the disciplinary action are fundamentally flawed.
3. Counseling
A third group of intentional infliction cases concerns allegations
that spiritual counseling, or counseling undertaken by a minister,
452. Id. at 780-81.
453. See supra notes 420-23, 436-38 and accompanying text.
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constitutes "outrageous" conduct. Intentional infliction claims in
this factual context are often alleged along with "clergy malprac-
tice '454 claims or defamation claims and frequently involve alleg-
edly improper advice and improper disclosure of matters discussed
between the plaintiff/parishioner and the defendant/religious
counselor.
The best known case in this category is Nally v. Grace Commu-
nity Church,455 a wrongful death action brought by parents of
twenty-four year-old Kenneth Nally, a member of the church who
committed suicide after spiritual and personal counseling by min-
isters of the church.456 Among the claims against the defendants
were "clergy malpractice" and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.5 The trial court granted the defendants' motions for
summary judgment on all claims, but the California Court of Ap-
peal reversed and remanded. 58 In the latter's view, there remained
triable issues of fact concerning the allegation that the ministers
had caused Kenneth's suicide by counseling him in a way that "ex-
acerbated [his] preexisting feelings of guilt, anxiety, and depres-
sion, knowing that [he] had suicidal tendencies. 459
In reaching its decision, the court expressly confronted a free ex-
ercise issue: whether a "clergyman or church should be immune
from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused
by the nature or content of counseling simply because the counsel-
ing may have a spiritual aspect. '46 0 The court answered that ques-
tion in the negative, relying on two cases that had nothing to do
454. For a succinct discussion, with copious citations, concerning this area, see Esbeck,
supra note 120, at 78-90; see also, Robert J. Basil-, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiri-
tual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (1988);
James L. Lehman, Note, Clergy Malpractice: A Constitutional Approach, 41 S.C. L. REv.
459 (1990).
455. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App. 1984) (Nally I) (ordered not published by the California
Supreme Court), on remand, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App. 1987) (Nally I/), rev'd on other
grounds, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). The Nally II court
reported that Nally I "generated a veritable firestorm of controversy in the nation's law
reviews." Nally 11, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
456. Nally I, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
457. See id. at 304-05.
458. Id. at 309.
459. Id. at 305.
460. Id. at 307.
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with intentional infliction of emotional distress 461 and on Lewis4 2
and Christofferson, es neither of which fairly arose within the con-
text of counseling and neither of which found grounds for an inten-
tional infliction claim. A dissenter in Nally I disagreed that any
triable issues of fact remained on the intentional infliction claim
and, citing the First Amendment,464 added a free exercise warning:
to allow such an action in a counseling case
could have the deleterious effect of opening a virtual Pandora's
box of litigation by subjecting all of the various religious faiths
and their clergy (e.g., ministers of the numerous Protestant de-
nominations; priests of the Roman Catholic faith and the vari-
ous Eastern Orthodox religions; rabbis of the Jewish faith, or-
thodox, conservative and reform, etc.) to wrongful death actions
and expensive full-blown trials simply because they were unsuc-
cessful in their sincere efforts through spiritual counseling to
help or dissuade emotionally disturbed members of their congre-
gations, who may be suicide prone, from carrying out such a
predisposition.465
On remand, the trial court entered nonsuit for defendants; the
court of appeal again reversed and remanded.66 In so doing, the
appellate panel deferred to the determination of the court in Nally
I that "the First Amendment does not create immunity shielding
these church-affiliated counselors from liability for intentionally or
recklessly encouraging a suicidal individual to take his life. '467 The
461. In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 (Ct. App. 1981) (affirming an order to remove
children from their parents' custody because of extreme, religiously motivated discipline);
Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1949) (imposing a constructive trust on gifts to a religious
official because of undue influence over the donor). The court in Nally I argued that "both
cases affirm the principle that remedies should exist for harm caused by extreme and outra-
geous conduct even when such conduct involves the expression of religious beliefs," Nally I,
204 Cal. Rptr. at 308, but completely ignored both the contours of the term "extreme and
outrageous" as used in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and any dis-
tinction between a tort claim and other kinds of actions.
462. Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983).
463. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition de-
nied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
464. Nally I, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 321 n.1 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 321 (footnote omitted).
466. Nally v. Grace Community Church, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (Ct. App. 1987) (Nally
II), rev'd on other grounds, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
467. Id.
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panel in Nally II nonetheless engaged in a lengthy discussion of
the First Amendment as it applied to the facts of the case, analyz-
ing a great deal of Supreme Court authority and citing numerous
law review articles.6 8 Interestingly, however, the court relegated
perhaps the most critical points in its analysis to two footnotes,
first asserting that
the instant civil action does not entail proof that the Grace
Community Church's beliefs or those of their pastoral counsel-
ors are false. Instead it requires proof they could foresee young
Nally was suicidal and, consistent or inconsistent with their be-
liefs about the proper remedy, failed to refer him to persons and
institutions which are specially authorized and equipped to pre-
vent suicide.4 69
The court also admitted that "[t]he content of the religious coun-
seling is relevant" to the intentional infliction claim.47 ° In other
words, the court in Nally II made it pretty clear that a pastor's
conduct could be labeled "outrageous" if his counseling reflected a
religious belief that "if one was unable to overcome one's sins, sui-
cide was an acceptable and even a desirable alternative to liv-
ing."'471 The dissenter in Nally II was thus entirely correct in as-
serting that "the majority has found one set of views to be false or
not adequate, something which it may not do" consistent with the
Free Exercise Clause.47 12 The California Supreme Court ultimately
reversed Nally II on nonconstitutional grounds. 13
468. Id. at 230-37.
469. Id. at 237 n.13.
470. Id. at 238 n.14.
471. Id. at 238.
472. Id. at 245 (Cole, J., dissenting). Judge Cole's immediate reference for this remark
was the religious belief of one defendant that a counselor should not refer his counselee to a
psychiatrist except under the most extraordinary circumstances. Id. His point has even
greater force against the majority's assertion concerning religious conceptions of suicide. In-
deed, Judge Cole later disagreed (in part, apparently on the same ground) with the major-
ity's admission of a tape recording of a Bible lesson in which the same defendant said,
"Suicide is one of the ways the Lord takes home a disobedient believer. . . Suicide for a
believer is the Lord saying, 'Okay, come on home. . . .If you're not going to deal with those
things in your life, come on home.' " Id. at 247 & n.9.




Erickson v. Christenson,474 in which the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals found that the plaintiff had stated a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, provides an interesting contrast.
Unlike the intermediate appellate courts in Nally I and Nally II,
the Oregon court did not have to delve into any religious beliefs at
all in reaching its decision for plaintiff. In Erickson, which in-
volved an appeal from a grant of dismissal for defendants, a mem-
ber of the Lutheran Church sued her pastor and the church, alleg-
ing that the pastor "misused his position as pastor and counselor
to abuse her sexually, causing her . . . emotional distress. '475 The
minister invoked the Free Exercise Clause in a limited way, argu-
ing that "because plaintiff's seduction could not be considered
'outrageous' were it not for the fact that he is a pastor, plaintiff's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress penalizes him
for exercising his religion. '476
Although the facts of the case are scantily reported, the court
apparently was correct in holding that the pastor's "arguments
misconstrue the nature of plaintiff's claims. '47 7 The "outrageous-
ness" of the conduct, said the court, "is not premised on the mere
fact that Christenson is a pastor," but rather on the fact that he
had developed a special relationship of trust with the plaintiff.4 78
The "character of Christenson's relationship with plaintiff" 47'
might allow a jury to find that his actions in seducing her "ex-
ceeded the limits of social toleration"; 4 0 thus, the dismissal was
erroneous.
48 1
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in Destefano v.
Grabrian482 found no free exercise barrier to adjudicating a plain-
tiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against a
Catholic priest, Grabrian, who had an affair with her while he was
counseling her and her husband.483 Both the husband and wife
474. 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
475. Id. at 385.
476. Id. at 386.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
480. Id. at 386.
481. Id.
482. 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
483. Id. at 284.
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sued Grabrian and his employer, the Diocese of Colorado Springs,
on a number of legal theories, including intentional infliction of
emotional distress.484 Both defendants argued that all of the plain-
tiffs' claims were barred by the First Amendment, asserting simply
that " 'the performance of pastoral duties by a Catholic priest, in-
cluding sacramental counseling of parishioners, is a matter of ec-
clesiastical cognizance and policy with which a civil court cannot
interfere.' "485
The trial court agreed, but the Colorado Supreme Court did not,
pointing out that the specific conduct alleged to be outrageous was
Grabrian's inducing the wife "to engage in a sexual relationship
during the course, and as a result, of marital counseling, '486 and
that the defendants had not asserted that this specific conduct was
religiously motivated.487 The supreme court admitted that "[i]f the
alleged conduct of Grabrian was dictated by his sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs or was consistent with the practice of his religion, we
would have to resolve a difficult first amendment issue. ' 488 It
found, however, that the defendants' brief disavowed any such
contention, noting that
[i]t has not been asserted that Grabrian's conduct falls within
the practices or beliefs of the Catholic church. Grabrian's and
the diocese's brief states that "every Catholic is well aware of
the vow of celibacy required of a priest at the time of his ordina-
tion." . . . The brief recognizes and admits that sexual activity
by a priest is fundamentally antithetical to Catholic doctrine. 88
Thus, the court correctly concluded that the priest's specific con-
duct was "by definition, not an expression of a sincerely held reli-
gious belief"'490 and therefore the Free Exercise Clause did not bar
the intentional infliction claim.491
The contrast between Nally, on the one hand, and Erickson and
Destefano, on the other, shows that not all intentional infliction
484. Id. at 278.
485. Id. at 283 (quoting Defendants' Brief).








cases in the counseling context necessarily involve the court in a
prohibited inquiry into whether the defendant's religious beliefs
are false or flawed. This is so mainly because in those cases, the
pastoral counseling itself, which will often-although not invaria-
bly-reflect religious beliefs, is not always at issue. In Erickson, for
example, the mere relationship of trust between the plaintiff and
the defendant was the sole area where "religion" was relevant. Be-
cause in such cases the action complained of-sexual seduction-is
not alleged to have been religiously motivated, the jury is asked to
label "outrageous" actions having nothing to do with religious be-
lief or conduct. Likewise, as in Destafano, when the defendant dis-
avows a religious motivation for the specific conduct at issue, adju-
dication of the outrageousness of the conduct cannot abridge free
exercise rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct specifically al-
leged to be "outrageous" is religiously motivated, as it appeared to
be in Nally and as will often be the case whenever the content of
spiritual counseling itself is the focus of the claim, it is difficult to
see how a court would adjudicate such a claim without entering the
theological thicket Justice Anderson warned of in Molko.
In sum, a blanket rule barring intentional infliction of emotional
distress actions in the context of religious counseling does not ap-
pear to be justified by freedom-of-religion concerns. Instead, courts
must look closely at the specific conduct alleged to be outrageous492
and determine in the first instance whether adjudication will in-
volve critiquing the defendant's religious beliefs. When it will not,
there should be no bar to adjudicating the claim.
We see this approach in Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox
Church,4 as in which the California Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's dismissal of an intentional infliction claim.494 A church
bishop, Roberson, and member, Snyder, who were having an extra-
marital affair, sued the church and other members for invasion of
privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, among other claims.495 The plaintiffs alleged that
492. In this context, the court must determine which aspect of the counselor/counselee
relationship is at issue in the case: religiously motivated conduct or merely a relationship of
trust.
493. 264 Cal. Rptr. 640 (Ct. App. 1989).
494. Id. at 648.
495. Id. at 641-42.
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Roberson voluntarily confessed his affair to two other church offi-
cials and received promises of confidentiality; that, in violation of
these promises of confidentiality, the two officials told "numerous
other persons" about the plaintiffs' affair;496 that another church
official divulged the affair to the congregation and excommuni-
cated Roberson from the church; that a counselor approached by
Snyder divulged the content of their conversation to church offi-
cials despite assurances that he would not do so; and that another
church official later "disclosed their confidences to a 'gathering of
local priests, ministers, pastors and guests.' ,,497 The defendants
moved to dismiss on the broadly stated ground that " 'the conduct
complained of is ecclesiastical in nature,' "48 and the trial court
granted the motion with respect to the intentional infliction
claim. 99
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, reasoning that al-
though religious expression was protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the key question-whether the allegedly tortious conduct
was in fact "religious expression"-was never asked and could not
be answered on the record before the court.500 The defendants ar-
gued on appeal that adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims would in
fact require the court to review such matters as " 'whether or not
the church's doctrines, teachings and practices called upon [church
officials] to reveal the content of the communication to the congre-
gation,' ",501 but plaintiffs had not even alleged that the actions
were taken pursuant to church doctrine.50 2 The court was faced, in
essence, with sloppy pleading, and complained:
The trial court was not told, and we do not know, inter alia,
whether it is a canon of respondents' belief that confessions...
are revealed to the congregation unless the offender repents;
whether it is church practice for the substance of a confession to
be shared among church officials; or whether it is consistent with
496. Id. at 642.
497. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' Complaint).
498. Id. (quoting Defendants' Answer).
499. Id.
500. Id. at 645.




church doctrine to reveal the substance of a confession to any-
one outside the church, and if so, under what circumstances.50 3
In short, on a motion to dismiss in a counseling case, the court said
that the defendants cannot prevail merely by generally alleging
"that their conduct was religious in nature";0 4 they must allege
more specifically what particular conduct was religiously mo-
tivated. 0 5
In Snyder, the court was clearly right to force defendants to
identify more particularly whether the purportedly tortious con-
duct was religiously motivated. Only in those cases in which the
defendant swears that the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains was religiously motivated should the defendant's free
exercise rights, and society's interest in religious toleration, even
be implicated. If issues relating to the alleged violations of confi-
dence and breaches of trust can be adjudicated without an inquiry
into religious belief or doctrine, those allegations may properly
support claims for "outrageous" conduct without free exercise
problems, as was the case in Erickson.06 In a case such as Nally,
however, when the religious content of the counselor's advice ap-
pears to be the target of the plaintiff's claim of "outrageousness,"
adjudication of that claim is likely to embroil the court in a forbid-
den inquiry into whether the underlying religious belief is funda-
mentally flawed.
If it were clear that courts would not accept free exercise de-
fenses in intentional infliction/counseling cases unless the specific
conduct at issue was religiously motivated, one would expect de-
fendants such as the minister in Erickson to refrain from even
making a free exercise argument. Such an approach certainly
would be better for the cause of religious freedom.0 7 The present
503. Id.
504. Id. at 648.
505. Id. at 647.
506. Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (adjudicating an intentional infliction claim without
inquiring into religious beliefs when defendants did not contend that specific acts were relig-
iously motivated).
507. See Esbeck, supra note 120, at 87 ("Few would have the hardihood to claim first
amendment immunity in defense of a suit charging a rabbi, priest, or pastor with sexual
improprieties involving others connected with the church.").
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confused state of affairs is perhaps best exemplified by an off-the-
cuff remark in an otherwise sound decision by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Strock v. Pressnell,508 a case involving a man who claimed
that a Lutheran minister counseling him and his wife had an affair
with his wife and destroyed his marriage. He sued for, among other
things, intentional infliction of emotional distress; 509 the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that this claim could not stand because in es-
sence it was an attempt to revive the abolished torts of alienation
of affections and criminal conversation.5 10
Freedom of religion was not properly an issue on the intentional
infliction claim because "it [was] clear that the alleged conduct was
nonreligious in motivation-a bizarre deviation from normal spiri-
tual counseling practices of ministers in the Lutheran Church."'51
In a footnote, the court added that neither the minister nor the
church "asserts that the alleged sexual relations were related in
any way to the teachings, beliefs or practices of the Lutheran
Church. '512 The court should have stopped there, but it added one
more sentence: "Indeed, we find it difficult to conceive of pastoral
fornication with a parishioner or communicant as a legitimate reli-
gious belief or practice in -any faith. '51 3 Once the motivation for
the tortious action is admitted to be nonreligious, the free exercise
problem disappears; for the court then to opine about what is or is
not "legitimate religious belief' clearly involves it in a forbid-
den-though, in this case, mercifully truncated-inquiry.514 The
508. 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988).
509. Id. at 1236.
510. Id. at 1244.
511. Id. at 1238.
512. Id. n.1.
513. Id. (emphasis added).
514. The news recently has been filled with stories about a religion, the Church of the
Most High Goddess, that has as one of its central tenets that "only women act as priests,
and they absolve the sins of men through sexual rites." 'Priestess' is a Prostitute, Jury
Says, CHI. THIB., Sept. 10, 1989, at 24. The priestess of the religion, Ellen Tracy, has been
quoted as saying that "sexual acts are an integral part of her religion as a 'path to the
divine.' " Steve Padilla, Woman Tells Court She Performed Sex for Religious Reasons, LA.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at B8. Her husband reportedly testified in court that "he received a
revelation from God in 1984 to re-establish a religion he says was practiced in ancient
Egypt," which required his wife "to have sex with 1,000 men to achieve her status as high
priestess of the church." Steve Padilla, Judge Rejects Claims of Sex Church, L.A. TIMES,
May 4, 1990, at B3. The church is purported to have 2,000 members. Religion Based on Sex
Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1990, at A17. Ms. Tracy served 150 days of a
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problem is that we invariably bring our own cultural and intellec-
tual biases to any such question; 515 the challenge is keeping such
questions out of the courts.
V. CAN WE STOP JUDGING "OTHER PEOPLE'S FAITHS"
IN INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS ACTIONS?
Proposing grand solutions to any doctrinal mess is a risky
endeavor if one actually intends to be taken seriously. As Grant
Gilmore said in The Ages of American Law, "[W]e will do well to
be on our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our
problems. As lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against
any suggestion that, through law, our society can be reformed, pu-
rified, or saved." 516 In the area of freedom of religion and the ways
it should best be balanced with other rights and interests, the
search for grand solutions seems particularly futile. No such propo-
sal is being championed here. Nonetheless, early in the life of a
new tort, when but a few cases involve a particular problem, it
seems useful to suggest some possible means of circumscribing
what is currently an almost boundless cause of action and to pro-
vide needed protection for important rights and interests that are
presently being given short shrift. To reiterate, the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress currently stands as an open-
ended invitation for jurors to grant substantial general damages
and punitive damages whenever a defendant's conduct may be
deemed "outrageous" and "intolerable in civilized society." When
the defendant's conduct is religiously motivated, special and seri-
ous difficulties with this scheme become apparent; in its broad
sweep, the tort may be used as a weapon of religious bigotry, in-
vading the defendant's free exercise rights and society's interest in
religious toleration. By allowing juries to ask whether religiously
motivated conduct is outrageous-without further guidelines as to
one-year sentence for prostitution. Sex-Church Leader Out of Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1991, at A20.
515. As William James said, "The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use, the
gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and upon one
another." JAMES, supra note 355, at 264.
516. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
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what is wrongful about the defendants' conduct, which are availa-
ble for every other tort or crime-courts in essence allow juries to
condemn the defendants' underlying religious beliefs as false or
fundamentally flawed. This is something secular courts should
avoid whenever possible, because failing to do so allows societal
norms to penalize and ultimately to suppress unpopular yet consti-
tutionally protected beliefs. As the dissenter in Molko stated,
"'Religious beliefs-whether held by adherents to new sects or by
"mainstream believers"-may not be dictated by societal norms.
Such norms can easily encourage labels that transform religious
beliefs into illnesses.' "517
Because of the serious problems with the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in this context, limits on the tort are
long overdue. As Laycock put it, "From beginning to end, these
cases consist of subjective and intangible elements[,] ...
provid[ing] maximum opportunity for juries to act on their
prejudices, and minimum opportunity for judges to control ju-
ries. 5 18 At the least, the remedial scheme bears reexamination, as
to both its punitive damages and general damages aspects.
Support for such a remedial reform proposal is available by anal-
ogy to defamation, another tort in which constitutional rights
weigh in the balance. In that area of law, the United States Su-
preme Court has severely limited both punitive and presumed gen-
eral damages, when the free speech interests are at their highest; in
cases involving either public figures or matters of public concern,
presumed or punitive damages are available only when the defend-
ant has spoken with "actual malice."5 19 The term "actual malice"
may sound much like "outrageousness," but in fact the former
term, unlike the latter, is not satisfied by the jury's rising red faced
and exclaiming, "Malicious!" Instead, "actual malice" has a spe-
cific meaning, that the speaker has spoken with knowledge of the
statement's falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
52 0
Thus, the malice standard of defamation is far more specific and
517. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 74 (Cal. 1988) (Anderson, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (quoting Shapiro, Of Robots, supra note 378, at 1316-17), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
518. Laycock, supra note 19, at 65.




definite than the outrageousness standard for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and accordingly provides the judge and jury
with much clearer remedial guidelines.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,521 the Supreme
Court correctly recognized that "[i]t would be . . .inappropriate
to say that, because punitive damages have been recognized for so
long, their imposition is never unconstitutional. ' 522 Some believe
the Court has not gone far enough with this idea, and have pro-
posed that punitive damages never be allowed in defamation cases,
arguing that "[t]he threat of enormous and unregulated punitive
damages may seriously threaten freedom of expression, ' 523 citing
"the danger that juries might award such damages against unpopu-
lar media defendants [even] in situations where the publication
was not willful. 5 24 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Haslip,
observed:
States routinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive dam-
ages without providing them any meaningful instructions on
how to do so. Rarely is a jury told anything more specific than
"do what you think best.". . . [S]uch instructions are so fraught
with uncertainty that they defy rational implementation. In-
stead, they encourage inconsistent and unpredictable results by
inviting juries to rely on private beliefs and personal predilic-
tions. Juries are permitted to target unpopular defendants, pe-
nalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute
wealth.520
These observations clearly apply to punitive damages awards in in-
tentional infliction cases and have special force when the allegedly
outrageous conduct is religiously motivated. Because the jury's fo-
cus is on the "outrageousness" of the act rather than defendant's
willfulness,5 26 there is a grave danger that juries will award sub-
stantial punitive damages against those with unpopular religious
521. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
522. Id. at 1043 (1991) (upholding a punitive damages award in an insurance fraud case
against due process challenge); see also id. at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Plunitive dam-
ages, despite their historical sanction can violate the First Amendment.").
523. Ingber, supra note 63, at 834.
524. Id.
525. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
526. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
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beliefs, thereby seriously threatening freedom of religion. Further-
more, allowing punitive damages awards in addition to awards of
general damages for intangible emotional harms seems unjustifi-
ably harsh, given that the general damages themselves serve a sig-
nificant punitive function.2 7
Even if courts were to bar or limit punitive damages in this con-
text, however, the availability of general damages for intangible
emotional harms remains problematic. Indeed, the entire dignitary
torts scheme of general damages for intangible injuries has been
criticized as giving the jury too much discretion to award large ver-
dicts against unpopular defendants,528 and the cases discussed in
this Article seem to illustrate that tendency all too well.5 29 A better
scheme might be to limit plaintiffs to actual pecuniary losses in
such cases, perhaps with some provision for attorney's fees.530 This
scheme would actually compensate plaintiffs for provable losses53'
while avoiding the imposition of penalties on religiously motivated
persons and groups, and would thus recognize more fully the im-
portance of the defendants' religious freedom rights and society's
religious tolerance interests, both of which are threatened by this
tort.
Even if the damages scheme were radically revised, however, we
still would be left with a situation in which a jury is free to label
religiously motivated conduct, explicitly and without further speci-
ficity, "extreme and outrageous" and "intolerable in civilized soci-
527. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text; see also Ingber, supra note 63, at 834
n.303 (noting that general and presumed damages serve less a compensatory and more a
punitive deterrent function).
528. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 63, at 778-79 (noting that "[j]uries are left with nothing
but their consciences to guide them" in fixing damages for intangible harms, and that "cases
involving intangible injuries are particularly susceptible to the threat of jury bias"). Ingber
takes the position that general damages are justified when the tortfeasor has intentionally
harmed the plaintiff. Id. at 791. However, even if one agrees with him in the abstract, one
may question how much "intent" is really required in intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases when the focus of the tort is really the outrageousness of the defendant's act.
529. See supra part IV.A.
530. See Ingber, supra note 63, at 812 & n.188 (arguing that if general damages were
eliminated, some provision for attorney's fees would be needed to avoid potential due pro-
cess problems).
531. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (requiring proof of actual injury for recovery
in a § 1983 case involving procedural due process deprivation); Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (extending Carey to substantive due process violations).
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ety." Granted, we allow juries and judges to label conduct, even if
religiously motivated, by implication when we allow, for example,
a prosecution for murder against a self-described religious leader
who ordered the killing of his enemies.5 32 The key difference be-
tween the kinds of condemnation, however, is that in an action for
intentional infliction, the jury's sole inquiry as to the social accept-
ability of the defendant's conduct is whether they would rise and
exclaim, "Outrageous!," whereas in a prosecution for murder, the
jury is not free simply to find guilt on the basis of its level of out-
rage-instead it must find that particular elements, specifically
and dispassionately set out by the judge, are satisfied. 533 Thus, al-
though one can think of several examples in which a jury is appar-
ently allowed to find implicitly that a religious belief motivating
some heinous act is "fundamentally flawed, ' 534 the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress-unlike any other legal ac-
tion-focuses the jury's attention on that issue alone, as part of the
unbridled inquiry into whether the religiously motivated conduct
at issue is extreme and outrageous. This is a serious problem that
calls not for remedial reform alone, but rather for a searching look
at the cause of action itself.
Only a radical restriction of the sweep of the tort will ameliorate
this problem. The threat from this tort to defendants' free exercise
rights and to society's strong interest in religious toleration justi-
fies barring its use in cases in which the defendants' conduct was
religiously motivated. If the plaintiff files a complaint containing a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
defendant should bear the burden of asserting that the specific
conduct alleged in the complaint to be "outrageous" was religiously
motivated.
532. See, e.g., Rosalind Resnick, Fla. Jurors Hear Tales of Sex, Religion, Death, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 10, 1992, at 8 (discussing the trial of Yahweh Ben Yahweh, accused of ordering his
"disciples" to kill dissenting sect members).
533. As one commentator humorously notes, if the method of adjudication of intentional
infliction of emotional distress cases were used in products liability actions, the sole issue
determining liability would be whether the jury could rise from their seats and exclaim,
"Defective!" Theis, supra note 52, at 290.
534. For example, if Yahweh Ben Yahweh and his followers actually believe that killing
wayward sect members is religiously correct, see Resnick, supra note 532, the prosecutor
may be asking the jury to condemn that belief implicitly as intolerable in civilized society in
order to reach a guilty verdict. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
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It should not be sufficient for the defendant to assert generally
that some underlying belief relating in some way to the conduct is
religious in nature. For example, if a defendant is sued for inflic-
tion of mental distress based on his browbeating a person outside a
family-planning clinic, the defendant should have to assert that
the browbeating-the specific conduct alleged to be outra-
geous-was a "religious exercise," not simply that the defendant
believes the Bible forbids abortion. Nor should it be sufficient for a
defendant to argue that the nature of the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant was religious in nature, as the defendant
attempted to do in Erickson, the Oregon counseling case.5 35 Only
in those cases in which the trier of fact's inquiry would involve
evaluating whether conduct motivated by religious belief is intol-
erable in civilized society does adjudication of the claim raise
problems with the free exercise right and the religious toleration
interest.
To have so much turn on religious motivation in adjudicating
whether conduct should be deemed "utterly intolerable in civilized
society" seems entirely consistent with the role of motivation in
tort law generally. "The motive or purpose underlying the defend-
ant's conduct frequently plays a rather important part in the de-
termination of tort liability. 53 6 The extent to which motive ex-
cuses or justifies the conduct, rendering it insufficiently socially
undesirable to be actionable, is the hard issue:
The real problem underlying the question of motive remains one
of weighing the conflicting interests of the parties, and deter-
mining whether the defendant's objective should prevail at the
expense of the damage to the plaintiff. Whether the social value
of that objective is sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the in-
terference often becomes the question of deciding significance. 37
Revealingly, too, the vast body of negligence cases shows that mo-
tivation behind the allegedly tortious actions is often taken into
account in determining, as part of plaintiff's prima facie case,
whether the defendant's conduct falls below acceptable social
norms. One good example of this is the so-called "emergency doc-
535. Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. App. 1989).
536. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 5, at 26.
537. Id. at 28.
[Vol. 34:579
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT
trine," which provides that one who acts in a certain way because
of an emergency is judged by the standard of care of a reasonable
person in an emergency, not by the standard of a person who has
time to reflect. 3
Logic, although perhaps not the "life of the law,"'53 also sup-
ports the notion that before conduct can be condemned it should
be explained; that before we may label conduct antisocial-espe-
cially the more extreme our label-we need to know why it oc-
curred. The particular motivation will not always excuse the con-
duct, of course; the point is that it sometimes will and thus it is
logically relevant to our evaluation. In sum, if we seek to deter only
socially undesirable conduct, we must always allow a place in that
determination for a full explanation of not only the nature of the
act but also of why the act was committed, because that explana-
tion may throw an entirely different light on the' social desirability
of the conduct.
Yet therein lies the danger. When the plaintiff argues expressly
that the defendant's conduct is utterly intolerable in civilized soci-
ety, and when that conduct has been motivated by religious belief,
then adjudication of the case is dangerous to the right of free exer-
cise and to the interest in religious toleration. For it is not the
mainstream religion that finds its tenets condemned in this man-
ner; rather, it is the new religion, the minority religion, that is held
to be inadequate to excuse the "outragous and intolerable" con-
duct that it has spawned.
This may be so simply because most Protestants, Catholics, and
Jews find that the values of their religions and the values implicit
in the secular laws of the United States are generally in accord.
Rather than sanctioning the kind of religious intoleration that is
the by-product of adjudicating these cases, however, this fact
merely exposes the insidious danger inherent in this kind of adju-
dication. In other words, the majority may predictably regard the
defendant's religiously motivated conduct as antisocial simply be-
cause they cannot fathom a "true" religion-such as their
own-motivating such conduct. We should restrict the majority's
538. See id. § 33, at 196.
539. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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chances for making such determinations pursuant to, and with the
force of, law whenever we can.540
Such considerations cut in favor of barring intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims when the defendants' conduct was re-
ligiously motivated. However, what would remain of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress after any such substantive
reform depends upon whether the courts would engage in further
inquiry into the bases for a defendant's assertion of religious moti-
vation. If the courts did inquire further, then only those acts that a
court determines are religiously motivated (as opposed to philo-
sophically motivated, for instance), would be removed from the
tort's sweep, leaving all such conduct not so defined vulnerable to
being labeled "outrageous." If courts did not inquire further, then
a much wider group of cases would be barred, possibly delivering a
death blow to the tort as we know it. Neither solution is problem-
free, to say the least, but nor is the status quo.
Only a narrow class of cases would be eliminated from the tort's
purview if courts engaged in a limited inquiry into whether con-
duct alleged to be religiously motivated was in fact motivated by a
religious belief. The fact that courts have engaged in such inquir-
ies, however, does not make the inquiries any easier.5 41 The United
States Supreme Court, while recognizing that "[o]nly beliefs rooted
in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion, ' ' 542 has
540. The people are -certainly free to hold and express such views outside the legal setting,
and indeed have a constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech that expressly allows
criticism of minority religions as false. The evil that this Article explores occurs when that
kind of intolerance becomes entrenched in our laws. We are better off as a society in the
situation Peter Berger has described:
[Rieligion in America finds itself in a market situation.. .. The state coerces
no one into this or that religious community, and therefore each such commu-
* nity must inevitably compete with others for the allegiance and support of
freely opting individuals. To be sure, such a situation allows all sorts of medi-
ocrities and even charlatans to thrive in religion, as in every other area of
culture.
Peter L. Berger, From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis of Secularity, in RELIGION AND
AMERICA: SPIRITUALITY IN A SECULAR AGE 14, 22-23 (Mary Douglas & Steven Tipton eds.,
1983).
541. For an excellent and succinct discussion of the difficulties of formulating a constitu-
tional definition of religion, see Mary H. Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The
Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 630-63 (1987).
542. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
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consistently backed away from defining religion, declaring that "re-
ligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion. ' 54 3 The possible scope of "religion" is thus quite broad,
although certain belief systems-Thoreau's, for example-have
been labeled nonreligious. 44
The benefit of this approach would be in limiting the religious-
motivation defense to only those defendants whose motivating be-
liefs are, in a court's opinion, actually religious. This approach pre-
sumably would prevent believers in the credos of the National
Rifle Association or the Nazi Party, for example, from asserting
successfully that their beliefs in those credos are religious in nature
and that they should therefore be exempt from liability for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress for specific acts motivated by
those beliefs. The hurdle of proving the religious nature of the be-
liefs would thus preserve the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, carving out of it only a relatively small number of
cases.
Such a hurdle seems, at least on its surface, both a moderate and
sensible one. Yet it has serious problems, as many have recog-
nized.545 Its primary problem is that inquiry into whether a belief
is religious invariably involves the court in the forbidden examina-
tion of the verity of religious beliefs. Inquiries into whether a de-
fendant sincerely believes the religious views he acted upon,546 and
543. Id. at 714. For a provocative and pointed criticism of this state of affairs, see Stanley
Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 233 (1989).
544. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (dictum) (characterizing Thoreau's be-
liefs as "philosophical and personal rather than religious").
545. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REV. 579; George C. Freeman, I1, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Defini-
tion of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Mitchell, supra note 541, at 630-63; Note, To-
ward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
546. The United States Supreme Court employed such a test in two conscientious-
objector cases. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); United States v. See-
ger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). In both cases the Court was interpreting the draft-exemption
statute, which required that the applicant for exemption be "conscientiously opposed to
participation in war." 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that
the Court used a sincerity test in that context. Nonetheless, as one eminent scholar puts it,
"It is doubtful ... that 'sincerity' can really be examined without treading on the suppos-
edly forbidden area of the content of beliefs." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1527
(11th ed. 1985).
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whether the beliefs espoused are central to his religion, raise the
same difficulties. As one scholar has put it, inquiries into the reli-
gious nature of beliefs and the sincerity with which they are held
"are not only awkward and counterproductive," but they "also
threaten the values of religious freedom. 5 47 Another scholar has
asserted that any evaluation of the sincerity of a defendant's asser-
tion "often transforms into determination of religious truth."548
Centrality inquiries, too, invariably invade only "other people's
faiths." As one scholar has perceptively noted, "Any attempt to
declare such standards . . . runs the usual and grave risk of bias
toward Western, monotheistic religions, which have a recognized
center in worship of a single Supreme Being. "'54 Moreover, all such
inquiries create Establishment Clause concerns because "the judi-
cial definition of religion does more than simply limit religion; it
places an official imprimatur on certain types of belief systems to
the exclusion of others. 5 50
These rather compelling concerns therefore raise questions
about whether the court adjudicating an intentional infliction
claim should engage in an inquiry that by its nature threatens to
abridge the same interests and rights that courts are trying to up-
hold. The alternative is simply to take at face value each defend-
ant's sworn assertion that the conduct alleged to be outrageous was
religiously motivated. This approach has been called the "self-de-
fining principle," its thrust being that "a court will know that a
belief or practice is 'religious' because the claimant says it is."'551
Adopting a self-defining principle for the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress would be, in many ways, logically and
For examples of further analyses of this aspect of the conscientious-objector cases, see
Ingber, supra note 543, at 256-62 (citing, inter alia, Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All:
The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 31; Christopher H.
Clancy & Jonathan A. Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Concep-
tual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 ME. L. REV. 143 (1965)).
547. Marshall, supra note 19, at 310.
548. Ingber, supra note 543, at 248.
549. Lupu, supra note 113, at 959.
550. Marshall, supra note 19, at 310-11.
551. Ingber, supra note 543, at 247-48. Although he is critical of this principle, indeed
calling it a "nightmare," id., in the context of free exercise cases, Ingber nonetheless recog-
nizes that inquiring into the genuineness and sincerity of religious motivation "risks the
indirect imposition of an orthodoxy." Id. at 248.
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doctrinally consistent with the arguments made in this Article; it
would certainly keep courts out of the business of judicially exam-
ining "other people's faiths," at least in this particular tort, and it
would give great weight to religious freedom and religious tolera-
tion. Further, even if such a principle were adopted-if courts ad-
judicating intentional infliction claims required defendants only to
swear that the particular conduct at issue in the claim was relig-
iously motivated-there are some reasons to believe that not every
defendant would so swear. 52 The major barrier to such a defense is
that even if such an assertion of religious motivation were true, the
defendant may be "unwilling to assert that its beliefs and practices
dictate or condone the infliction of severe distress by spiritual
counselors. ' 553 To do so would be to expose the religion to even
more popular outrage, which religious groups might wish to avoid
above all else. A second barrier is imposed not so much on defend-
ants as on their lawyers: pleading that certain conduct is motivated
by religious belief when it is not is forbidden by procedural and
ethical rules. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
rules of professional conduct presently forbid frivolous or false as-
sertions by lawyers.5 4
552. Ingber has expressed this general concern, concluding that defining religion is una-
voidable, in part because otherwise, persons could get free exercise exemptions from gener-
ally applicable laws "as long as they assured the court their request was religion-based." Id.
at 249.
553. Note, Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors, 84 MxcH. L. REV. 1296, 1305
(1986) (citing defendants' pleading in Nally I, which disavowed any contention that their
religious beliefs sanctioned intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also, e.g., Strock
v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 n.1 (Ohio 1988) (reporting that defendants did not assert
that the alleged outrageous acts "were related in any way to the teachings, beliefs or prac-
tices of the Lutheran Church").
554. Rule 11 provides in relevant part that a lawyer (or party if unrepresented by a law-
yer) who signs a "pleading, motion or other paper" certifies that "to the best of his knowl-
edge, information and belief. . . it is well-grounded in fact. . . and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
For examples of ethical rules prohibiting false pleadings, see MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (1983) (forbidding lawyers from knowingly making a "false
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal" and from "offer[ing] evidence that the law-
yer knows to be false," which is substantially similar to provisions in MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONsmILIy DR 7-102(A) (1980)); id. Rule 3.4(b) ("A lawyer shall not ...
falsify evidence [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely."); id. Rule 4.1(a) (forbid-
ding lawyers "in the course of representing a client" from knowingly making "a false state-
ment of material fact or law to a third person," which is substantially similar to DR 7-
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These provisions certainly will act as a check on some, if not
most, attorneys to prevent them from assenting to their clients'
desires to say anything, even if false, in order to be freed from tort
liability. Perhaps these rules would have no "teeth" in this context,
that is, neither the court nor a disciplinary body would be able to
adjudicate whether the attorney violated the rules because the
original court could not inquire into the verity of the underlying
claim of religious motivation; it does not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that no one would comply with them. As a leading legal eth-
ics expert has noted, "The traditions of the practice of law and the
decent instincts of most lawyers doubtless supply most of the mo-
tivating force behind lawyer observance of mandatory, minimal
norms." 555 Further, empirical data suggest that people comply with
legal rules not because they fear punishment for violating them but
because they believe compliance is morally right.5 56
Let us assume, however, that if courts were to adopt a policy of
dismissing intentional infliction claims whenever a defendant is
willing to swear that his allegedly outrageous conduct was relig-
iously motivated, many defendants likely would take advantage of
that policy. This would mean that fewer, perhaps far fewer, inten-
tional infliction cases would result in plaintiffs' either recovering
after jury trial or obtaining a settlement in anticipation of possible
recovery. Despite the limitations noted above, some adherents to
belief systems that would not be labeled "religious" by today's
courts would be able to free themselves from liability from this
claim.
One's assessment of such a development would seem to turn on
the degree to which one believes that the tort in its present form is
fundamentally flawed. Ironically, those who do not believe that re-
ligion should occupy a favored position vis-A-vis other belief sys-
tems might well favor a self-defining principle in this tort, if they
were willing to see the tort emasculated. A defendant could per-
haps escape liability upon swearing that he believes as part of his
religion that creditors' rights are so superior to debtors' rights that
102(A) (5)); id. Rule 8.4(d) (making it "professional misconduct" to "engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice," which is identical to DR 1-102(A)(5)).
555. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.5, at 124 (1986).
556. See generally ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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any method of bill collection is justified. Another defendant could
perhaps get this particular tort claim dismissed by swearing that
her religious belief in the superiority of the Caucasian race, and
the corollary belief that nonwhites are undeserving of respect, ex-
cuses her use of racial epithets in the workplace.
Even if defendants began to make such assertions in many cases,
however, with the result that the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress was rendered wholly impotent, the sky would
hardly fall. No well-settled law is at stake; the tort is new557 and we
lived for a long time without it. The tort has resisted doctrinal re-
form due to its very indeterminacy, and it seems entirely appropri-
ate to limit its application-killing it, if necessary, in the pro-
cess-when experience tells us it sweeps too broadly. Further, even
in those cases in which the tort of intentional infliction is held to
be unavailable, recovery for emotional harms would still be availa-
ble as parasitic damages (pain and suffering) when they are proven
to be the result of another tortious act, such as assault, battery, or
false imprisonment.558
Thus, the defendant who asserts religious motivation as a de-
fense to an intentional infliction claim in a multiclaim tort case
would be freed only from the pernicious inquiry into whether his
conduct is "outrageous," not from all evaluation of the lawfulness
of his conduct. For example, a plaintiff such as Wollersheim might
be barred from recovering damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but if his allegations were true, he might re-
cover damages for assault, battery, and false imprisonment.559
Robin George might be barred from recovery on her intentional
infliction claim, but could recover for the wrongful death of her
father brought on by the stress of looking for her as she was held
by the Hare Krishnas.560
557. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
558. This was the state of the law prior to the recognition of the independent tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 12, at 57.
559. Wollersheim alleged that he was held on board a ship and audited against his will
and that when he tried to escape, he was "seized" and held captive until he agreed to re-
main in the religion. See Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Ct.
App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990), and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991).
560. An expert testified at trial that Jim George's fatal heart attack might have been
brought on by the stress occasioned by his search for his daughter. See George v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 230 (Ct. App. 1989) (ordered not
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In none of these other claims is the jury told to decide, explicitly
and as the core of the claim, whether the defendant's religiously
motivated conduct is utterly intolerable in civilized society. In-
stead, in each of these other claims, the jury is told much more
specifically what comprises the wrongful conduct. For example, a
plaintiff who claims to have been falsely imprisoned must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant intended to con-
fine, that plaintiff was confined, and that plaintiff was aware of
that confinement.561 The kind of "condemnation" of defendant's
religion that may be implied in an adjudication of such a claim is
very different from that involved in the intentional infliction cases.
In short, few if any of these other claims present the same degree
or kind of problem with religious rights and interests as does the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Even if the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
were to be eliminated entirely, new torts could arise to cover any
holes left in the jurisprudential landscape. If, for example, a de-
fendant uses outrageous bill collection methods to harass a plain-
tiff, and plaintiff suffers emotional distress and no other harm, no
barrier exists to a common law court's creation of an entirely new
tort cause of action to apply to the case. Prosser's hornbook indi-
cates that "[n]ew and nameless torts are being recognized con-
stantly, and the progress of the common law is marked by many
cases of first impression in which the court has struck out boldly to
create a new cause of action, where none had been recognized
before. '562
The demise of the intentional infliction tort could be chalked up
to fundamental flaws in its character: its attempt to cover too
much ground too broadly and to provide too flexible a tool against
all kinds of antisocial acts-to be defined on an ad hoc basis-than
was ever practically possible. Yet parts of its coverage could be
redistributed to new, more specific tort actions with more specific
names and more specific elements. In this way, deserving plaintiffs
who formerly would have utilized the intentional infliction tort for
published by the California Supreme Court), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990), and vacated,
111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
561. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
562. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 1, at 3-4.
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recovery would not remain without a remedy, and culpable defend-
ants would not escape justice. Some of these new torts might allow
recovery for intangible harms; some might allow recovery of gen-
eral damages; some might support punitive awards. Revealingly,
however, one can scarcely imagine that any new tort would be
called "outrageous religious conduct."
VI. CONCLUSION
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is an effec-
tive weapon against defendants who have acted in accordance with
their religious beliefs, especially when those beliefs are not ac-
cepted by the mainstream. When this tort action is brought by a
plaintiff and the allegedly "outrageous" conduct is religiously moti-
vated, an inevitable clash of values emerges: the communitarian
values of tort law, committed to enforcing societal norms of accept-
ability, versus the defendant's right to free exercise of religion and
society's strong interest in tolerating religious diversity.
Adjudication of these cases frequently results in and reflects reli-
gious bigotry-secular juries' rejection of the social acceptability of
"other people's faiths." This is so because the adjudication of the
element of "outrageousness" that is the core of the tort involves
the jury in an open-ended, ad hoc determination of whether the
defendant's religiously motivated conduct is socially intolerable.
Such an inquiry necessarily threatens to label a defendant's reli-
gious beliefs as either false or fundamentally flawed, thus running
afoul of a well-established prohibition on secular courts' adjudicat-
ing the verity of religious belief.
Ending this grave problem will require judicial recognition of the
negative effects of this tort on the rights of religious freedom and
the interest in religious toleration. Certainly such measures as a
ban on punitive damages awards, restrictions on the general dam-
ages that can be recovered for intangible harms, and changes in the
scope of the cause of action itself would improve the situation. Ul-
timately, the best option may be the most radical: abandoning fur-
ther development and application of the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and beginning anew to develop torts for
specific situations now within the tort's purview.
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